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INTRODUCTION
Can patent rights and public health coexist? This is a pressing global
question in an era where the AIDS pandemic rages in countries that cannot
afford to pay for the most effective-and patent-protected-AIDS treat-
ment. Even in countries with higher levels of income, patent problems may
nonetheless loom large in unanticipated situations that could turn deadly
without access to patented drugs, such as the 2001 anthrax "crisis" or the
potential avian flu epidemic.
Each of these examples is further complicated by the existence of in-
ternational agreements that mandate certain levels of patent protection.
Historically, nations could decline to provide patent protection for drug
compositions to promote innovation and competition, resulting in low-cost
and widespread access to drugs. However, such flexibility is now a non-
existent luxury for most nations after the conclusion of the landmark inter-
national agreement, the Trade-Related Intellectual Property Agreement
("TRIPS"), which established the first-ever minimum levels of patent rights
on a global scale. 1 Although there is language in TRIPS that suggests na-
tions have some flexibility to balance public health against patent rights,
that flexibility has been repeatedly challenged. 2 In addition, while United
Nations declarations provide a competing framework to support a right to
health, the relative lack of enforceability of such a right compared to the
exceptionally strong enforcement of patent rights under TRIPS, pursuant to
the highly effective Dispute Settlement Understanding ("DSU") that gov-
erns TRIPS and all other agreements to the World Trade Organization
("WTO"), 3 shifts the balance in favor of patent rights.4
1. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IC, Results of the Uruguay
Round, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS]. The new patent requirements
are binding on all member states of the comprehensive World Trade Organization ("WTO"). Because of
the breadth of the WTO membership, TRIPS effectively established near universal requirements of
patent rights. See Understanding the WTO: The Organization: Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/ english/thewto_e/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2007) (listing
150 member states).
2. See, e.g., TRIPS, supra note 1, arts. 7-8; see also infra Part I.
3. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instruments-
Results of the Uruguay Round, art. 23, app. 1, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter DSU].
4. Agreements under the WTO that are enforceable via the DSU are universally considered the
most effective means of enforcing international law. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Two Achievements of the Uruguay Round: Putting TRIPS and Dispute Settlement Together,
37 VA. J. INT'L L. 275, 276-77 (1997); Laurence Heifer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and
New Dynamics of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 22 (2004).
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Although there have been some significant developments within the
context of TRIPS concerning public health, the issue of an appropriate
balance remains a pressing problem. For example, despite a unanimous
declaration concerning the importance of considering public health with
respect to TRIPS, as well as a waiver of one TRIPS requirement to enable
imports of lower cost drugs, 5 developing countries and public health advo-
cates have criticized such actions as inadequate, modest reforms. 6 More-
over, wealthier countries that have resisted greater consideration of public
health within TRIPS may, ironically, be unduly constrained in addressing
their own domestic crises if they face unexpected national epidemics. 7 In
addition, existing and pending international agreements subsequent to
TRIPS have introduced heightened levels of patent protection that further
prevent nations from considering public health needs. 8 The increasing pro-
liferation of such agreements, commonly dubbed "TRIPS-plus" agreements
for their heightened requirements, underscores the critical need to reevalu-
ate the global balance of patent rights and public health.
Thus far, there has been a lack of balanced scholarship considering the
potential effects of increasing patent rights on both developing and devel-
5. See World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health of 14 November 2001, 5(a), (c), WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha
Public Health Declaration]; General Council Decision of 30 August 2003, Implementation of Para-
graph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 (Sept. 2,
2003) [hereinafter 2003 General Council Decision].
6. See, e.g., Rachel Kiddell-Monroe, Canada s Generic Drug Law Is All Talk, No Action, GLOBE
& MAIL, Aug. 14, 2006, at A 13 (reporting that not only is the WTO waiver unworkable, but that even
after Canada passed legislation to implement the waiver, no drugs have been exported despite a stand-
ing two-year request by Doctors Without Borders); Oxfam International, Patents Versus Patients: Five
Years After the Doha Declaration 19-20 (Oxfam Briefing Paper No. 95, 2006) (declaring the Paragraph
6 solution one "wrapped in red tape"); see also Ellen 't Hoen, A Guide to the Post-2005 World: TRIPS,
R&D and Access to Medicines, MSF, Feb. 25, 2005, http://www.msf.org/ msfinterna-
tional/contentladvocacy/accesstoessentialmedicinescampaign/index.cfm (follow "A guide to the post-
2005 world: TRIPS, R&D and access to medicines" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 24, 2007) (suggesting
that the paragraph 6 solution is "needlessly complex" and that the TRIPS flexibilities require political
will on a national level); Robert Weisman, The WTO: Areas of Concern, and What We Are Doing,
ESSENTIALACTION.ORG, Aug. 21, 2006. http://www.essentialaction.org/ access/index.php?/archives/49-
The-WTO-Areas-of-Concem,-and-What-We-Are-Doing.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2007).
7. See, e.g., Letter from Henry A. Waxman, Sherrod Brown & Thomas H. Allen to Rob Portman,
U.S. Trade Representative (Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://oversight.house.gov/Documents/
20051205181731-42316.pdf [hereinafter Waxman Letter] (arguing that the United States should not
foreclose the possibility of compulsory licensing in case of a public health emergency); CPTech State-
ment to the Subcommittee on Labor, Health and Human Services, Education and Related Agencies of
the Senate Committee on Appropriations-Possible Avian Bird Flu Pandemic Highlights Flaws in U.S.
Trade Policy (Nov. 2, 2005), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/tamiflu/cptechI1022005.doc
(suggesting that the United States trade position may hinder domestic health in the event of an avian flu
crisis and requesting the United States Trade Representative ("USTR") reconsider its position); see also
infra note 71 (describing an altered interpretation of TRIPS requirements by the United States and
Canada in the face of the 2001 anthrax "crisis" in North America).
8. See infra note Part II.
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oped countries. TRIPS-plus agreements have typically been negotiated and
endorsed by government trade representatives under the strong influence of
the large pharmaceutical companies that are the primary beneficiaries of
increased patent rights.9 In addition, although some have criticized TRIPS,
as well as TRIPS-plus agreements, proposals to either eliminate TRIPS or
to impose a moratorium on new agreements are likely too radical to be
readily embraced 0-at least while the United States continues to be under
a strong mandate to secure ever-increasing levels of patent protection. I I
This is especially true for countries that are strongly attracted to the pros-
pect of increased market access in wealthy countries, even if it is at the cost
of future public health needs.
This Article aims to provide a timely and realistic assessment that will
help promote positive development for all countries. It attempts to move
beyond polarized past discussions to highlight not only current pitfalls, but
also how to better address the growing disconnect between patent rights
and public health. In particular, this Article hopes to underscore that recon-
sideration of TRIPS-plus requirements is critical at this juncture, since
these requirements may unduly restrict the national flexibilities of even
developed countries that are currently strong patent-right advocates. Al-
though no single scholarly piece is likely to provide a comprehensive solu-
tion to balancing patent rights and public health, this Article hopes to better
illuminate existing problems and issues for all countries with the aim of
improving future discussions.
Part I of this Article begins with a discussion of TRIPS, not only be-
cause of its extensive reach, but also because it provides a useful point of
comparison with subsequent agreements involving patent rights and public
health. This part first introduces the inherent flexibilities in TRIPS, as well
as the Doha Public Health Declaration, which reaffirms the importance of
respecting these flexibilities for public health interests. Then, the specific
9. See generally SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 39-53 (2003) (describing the successful efforts of major industries
in software, entertainment, and pharmaceuticals in influencing the trade position of the United States).
10. See, e.g., Undermining Access to Medicines: Comparison of Five US FTAs, OXFAM BRIEFING
NOTE (Oxfam Int'l, Boston, Mass.), June 2004; see also infra notes 137-51 and accompanying text
(discussing proposed agreements to both establish minimum standards of access and forego dispute
resolution under existing treaties, the Access to Knowledge Treaty, and the Medical Research Devel-
opment Treaty Proposal).
I1. The USTR has a strong mandate to continue to negotiate and implement trade agreements with
ever-stronger terms for intellectual property laws. See, e.g., Trade Act of 2002 § 2102(b)(4)(a)(i)(lI), 19
U.S.C. § 3802(b)(4)(A)(i)(lI) (2006) (noting that a primary objective of the United States regarding
trade-related intellectual property rights is to ensure that "provisions of any multilateral or bilateral
trade agreement ... entered into by the United States reflect a standard of protection similar to that
found in United States law").
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patent requirements and exceptions are delineated, including opportunities
for countries to maximize public health considerations.
Part II of this Article then turns to TRIPS-plus agreements and how
they further compromise consideration of public health issues. Part II takes
a topical approach to these agreements to highlight new trends, including
new requirements of what must be patented, extended patent terms and
limited exceptions to patent rights. In addition, this part discusses the grow-
ing use of a new form of protection over data submitted to national regula-
tory agencies.
Part III provides a perspective on methods to address and overcome
the growing TRIPS-plus requirements. This part reviews current interna-
tional and domestic efforts to preserve public health considerations, as well
as technology-based options.
I. TRIPS
TRIPS is the cornerstone of global intellectual property laws because
it sets forth minimum standards for all WTO member countries, composed
of a majority of both developed and developing countries. While the term
"minimum standards" may not seem intrusive, mandating patent standards
was a major issue for nations that previously provided limited, or in some
cases no, patent protection. Indeed, agreement to TRIPS is often described
as a package deal whereby developing countries acceded to TRIPS re-
quirements in exchange for other benefits of WTO membership, including
increased access to foreign markets.' 2 Although TRIPS requirements re-
flect the laws of developed countries, developing countries may have ini-
tially believed that there was sufficient flexibility within the framework of
TRIPS to preserve their ability to foster public health interests. For exam-
ple, the preamble to TRIPS explicitly recognizes that there are "underlying
12. See, e.g., Ruth L. Gana, The Myth of Development, the Progress of Rights: Human Rights to
Intellectual Property and Development, 18 LAW & POL'Y 315, 334 (1996) (noting that "the TRIPS
Agreement accomplishes, through the potential threat of economic ostracism, what could not be accom-
plished through negotiations independent of the international economic framework"); Donald P. Harris,
Carrying a Good Joke Too Far: TRIPS and Treaties of Adhesion, 27 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 681,
724-38 (2006) (arguing that TRIPS is analogous to a contract of adhesion of which developing coun-
tries had little choice to accept); Heifer, supra note 4, at 2-3 (noting that TRIPS is defended as a pack-
age deal); Arie Reich, The WTO As a Law-Harmonizing Institution, 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 321,
362 (2004) (noting that the WTO negotiations succeeded where prior WIPO negotiations failed, be-
cause TRIPS was presented as a package deal to which countries could not resist if they wanted access
to global markets); Gregory Shaffer, Power and Global Governance: The Need for A Comparative
Institutional Approach, in POWER AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 8 (Michael Barnett & Bud Duvall eds.,
2004). In addition, developing countries believed that by signing onto WTO and TRIPS, they could
avoid unilateral actions by developed countries. See, e.g., CARLOS M. CORREA, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS, THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 11 (2000).
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public policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellec-
tual property, including developmental and technological objectives.' 13
Within the body of TRIPS, there are articles entitled "objectives" and
"principles" that address societal policies beyond intellectual property
rights. For example, Article 7, entitled "objectives," explicitly states that
intellectual property rights should contribute "to the mutual advantage of
producers and users... in a manner conducive to social and economic
welfare."' 14 Article 8, entitled "Principles," similarly refers to values be-
yond promoting innovation and explicitly states that members may adopt
measures to protect public health and nutrition; however, the scope of such
measures has always been controversial since only measures that are "con-
sistent" with TRIPS are permissible. 15
The appropriate balance between patent rights and other social poli-
cies has been of continued importance since the conclusion of TRIPS. In
the years immediately after TRIPS was signed, there was some debate con-
cerning the interpretive value of provisions relating to social policies such
as public health. 16 The controversy has somewhat abated in light of the
2001 Doha Declaration on Public Health, unanimously agreed to by all
WTO member countries present at the Doha Ministerial Conference. In
particular, the Declaration states affirmatively that "[i]n applying the cus-
tomary rules of interpretation of public international law, each provision of
the TRIPS Agreement shall be read in the light of the object and purpose of
the Agreement as expressed, in particular, in its objectives and princi-
ples."17 Although the Doha Public Health Declaration is not an official
amendment to TRIPS, it does have interpretative value and supports the
argument that the principles and objectives set out in Articles 7 and 8 of
TRIPS, such as balancing patent rights with development goals, are rele-
vant. 18
13. TRIPS, supra note 1, pmbl.
14. Id. art. 7.
15. Id. art. 8(l).
16. See, e.g., J.H. Reichman, From Free Riders to Fair Followers: Global Competition Under the
TRIPS Agreement, 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 11, 35 (1997) (suggesting that under "appropriate
circumstances" Articles 7-8 of TRIPS could be used as independent ad hoe exceptions).
17. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 5, 5(a).
18. See James Thuo Gathii, The Legal Status of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and Public
Health Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 291, 301-07
(2002); see also JEROME H. REICHMAN & CATHERINE HASENZAHL, NON-VOLUNTARY LICENSING OF
PATENTED INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK UNDER TRIPS, AND AN
OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA 16 (2003) (noting that although the legal status
is "uncertain," on a practical level, the Declaration could be an authority from which future panels
could "draw guidance" when deciding cases).
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The Doha Public Health Declaration is also important with respect to
patents and public health for several other reasons. For example, the Decla-
ration affirmatively states that
[w]e agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not
prevent Members from taking measures to protect public health.
Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be in-
terpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Mem-
bers' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote
access to medicines for all. 19
On the other hand, this positive affirmation does not provide specific guid-
ance on how the TRIPS provisions can be interpreted so as to promote pub-
lic health, with the result that parties may be in the same position of
arguing over the appropriate scope of flexibility under TRIPS. 20
Now that some of the overarching policy issues and controversies
have been framed, the specific patent requirements of TRIPS will be de-
lineated, including their impact on public health. First, what must be typi-
cally patentable under TRIPS will be explained, together with the scope of
some limited exceptions. Then, the scope of patent rights will be defined,
together with exceptions to such patent rights. With respect to the scope of
patentability as well as patent rights, the exceptions are often critical to
providing an avenue to preserve national sovereignty in determining the
appropriate balance between the rights of creators and users of patented
inventions. However, even with explicit exceptions, differing interpreta-
tions of the scope of the exceptions have led to disputes between member
states, as will be discussed.
A. Patentability
TRIPS requires that patents be available for all "inventions" in all
fields of technology if they comply with the other requirements of TRIPS.
In addition, TRIPS specifies that patents must be available for products and
processes. 2 1 This requirement forces some countries to effectuate a major
change in patent laws with an impact on public health. For example, prior
to TRIPS, India provided patents, but provided only process patents on
19. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 5, 4.
20. Of course, controversies remain under the guidance and oversight of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding that governs all agreements pursuant to the WTO. DSU, supra note 3, app. I (noting
TRIPS as one of the agreements covered by the DSU). This procedure favors mutually agreed resolu-
tions, but will nonetheless convene a judicial-type panel if member states fail to reach an agreement.
The existence of this process is an important factor in promoting resolution, because failure to comply
carries heavy penalties, including the potential for trade sanctions. Id. art. 3(7).
21. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(1).
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pharmaceuticals so as to promote low cost drugs and greater innovation.
However, under TRIPS, so long as an invention meets the technical re-
quirements of patentability, a patent must be granted for an inventive prod-
uct, including a pharmaceutical compound, even if it would negatively
impact the accessibility of drugs. 22 On the other hand, since the term "in-
vention" is not defined in TRIPS, countries have some flexibility to ex-
clude undesired subject matter by more narrowly defining an invention.23
For example, although Western countries tend to adopt a very broad defini-
tion of what constitutes an invention--considering it satisfied if a substance
in nature is isolated or purified-TRIPS does not require member states to
follow such standards. 24
The relevant technical requirements mandate that inventions be "new,
involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application," or-
stated differently-new, non-obvious, and useful. 25 Additionally, the patent
application must adequately disclose the invention such that a person of
similar technical skill could carry out the invention. 26 Importantly, the lack
of an explicit definition of what constitutes "new" allows member states to
self-define these terms, which for some countries means not changing their
existing definitions.
Because of the lack of a definition for "new," TRIPS does not produce
uniform standards for what types of invention will be considered new.
Rather, it allows countries to continue with standards that have differing
impacts. For example, in many European countries, "new" requires that an
invention not have been previously known anywhere in the world.27 On the
other hand, the United States considers an invention "new" even if it is
known outside the United States-so long as the knowledge is not docu-
mented in writing. 28
22. See generally id. art. 27 (providing no exclusion for inventions that impact accessibility of
drugs).
23. See id. (providing no definition for "invention").
24. See, e.g., Carlos M. Correa, Patent Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 189, 198 (Carlos M. Correa & Abdulqawi A. Yusuf eds., 1998)
(noting disparate treatment as applied to biotechnology-related inventions).
25. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(1); see also id. n.5 (noting that "[f]or the purposes of this Article,
the terms 'inventive step' and 'capable of industrial application' may be deemed by a Member to be
synonymous with the terms 'non-obvious' and 'useful' respectively").
26. Id. art. 29. Both the technical requirements of the invention and the patent application are not
further defined in TRIPS, but are understood to be identical to Western patent laws.
27. See Convention on the Grant of European Patents, art. 54(2), Oct. 5, 1973, 1065 U.N.T.S. 199
[hereinafter EPC], available at http://www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/.
28. Under the United States rules, an invention may be deemed new, and thus patentable, even if it
is known in another country-so long as the knowledge is not documented in any fixed writing. See 35
U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). However, there are proposals to amend the U.S. patent laws. See, e.g., Patent
Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. § 3(b)(l) (2005).
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The differing standards on what inventions are considered "new" af-
fects what might be patentable. In particular, with a narrower standard,
such as the one in Europe, the scope of patentable subject matter is nar-
rower, with the corollary result that more is publicly available and accessi-
ble because it is not subject to patent. In addition, as a preview to changes
under TRIPS-plus agreements, the lack of a definition of "new" under
TRIPS enables some countries to deny patents on new uses of previously
known compounds. For example, if scientists discover that a patented com-
pound initially used for heart disease is actually useful for minimizing
wrinkles, then that new use need not be patented. If the new use is not pat-
ented, it becomes freely available because no single producer will have the
right to exclude others from such use.
Available to member states are several possible exceptions to the gen-
eral rule that patent protection be available for all inventions. There are a
few categorical subject matters that are exempted, as well as one broad-
based exemption, although all have implications for public health. First,
members may, but need not, exclude methods of medical diagnosis and
treatment for humans and animals. 29 Accordingly, countries may exclude
methods of medical diagnosis and treatment, thereby lowering health care
costs with respect to such technology. In addition, members may exclude
plants and animals "other than micro-organisms" from patentability, al-
though "plant varieties [must be protected] either by patents or by an effec-
tive sui generis system." 30 This exclusion was controversial when the
29. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(3)(a) (noting that members may exclude "diagnostic, therapeutic
and surgical methods for the treatment of humans or animals"). This exception is similar to the rule in
both the EPC and Japan; however, since the exclusion is merely permissive, it also allows the United
States to maintain its patent laws that have no such exclusion.
30. Id. art. 27(3)(b). This exception bears some facial similarity to the previous law in Europe and
Japan that varieties need not be protected, but for the first time requires some alternative system of
protection. Although TRIPS does not define what constitutes an "effective" sui generis system, many
commentators have assumed that international agreements protecting plant varieties that existed at the
time of TRIPS would be pertinent. See, e.g., DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 225 (2d ed. 2003) (suggesting that TRIPS negotiators assumed UPOV-type
protection-and in particular, UPOV (1991 )-would be considered adequate); Correa, supra note 24, at
197 (noting that the reference to sui generis may be interpreted to refer to the Union for the Protection
of Plant Varieties ("UPOV") convention, although also suggesting that the language provides an oppor-
tunity to develop other sui generis protection). Moreover, this ambiguity may be more of a theoretical
issue since subsequent agreements have often specified the exact agreement that must be adopted. See,
e.g., DAVID VIVAS-EUGUI, REGIONAL AND BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND A TRIPS-PLUS WORLD: THE
FREE TRADE AREA OF THE AMERICAS (FTAA) 3-4, 18-19 (2003), available at
http://www.quno.org/geneva/pdf/economic/lssues/FTAs-TRIPS-plus-English.pdf. Other agreements
strongly suggest or even require patent protection. E.g., Central America-Dominican Republic-United
States Free Trade Agreement, art. 15.9(2), Aug. 5, 2004 [hereinafter CAFTA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DRFina -Texts/Section Index.
html (technically preserving a sui generis option, yet mandating "reasonable efforts" be made to pro-
vide patent protection); U.S.-Austl. Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.9(t)-(2), U.S.-Austl., May 18, 2004,
T.I.A.S. No. 6422 [hereinafter Australia FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade- Agree-
2007]
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TRIPS negotiations were concluded because some members opposed pro-
viding any protection on life forms (whether through patents or another
system). In addition, if some types of plants are provided patent protection,
that protection may impede a state's ability to access those plants that pro-
vide nutritional and health benefits, because the plants' protected status will
increase their market costs. Because of the heated dispute, the final agree-
ment provided that it was to be reviewed four years after its conclusion,
with parties contemplating possible changes of the provision at that time. 31
However, this controversy has not abated; rather it has increased with re-
spect to the new issue of whether patents should be granted for biologically
based material that is derived from plant resources or the traditional knowl-
edge of indigenous people. 32
The final exception to the general scope of patentability under TRIPS
lies in Article 27(2). This article does not categorically exclude any particu-
lar subject matter. Rather, it permits members to exclude an invention if the
member believes that the prevention of commercial exploitation of the
invention within the member country "is necessary to protect ordre public
or morality, including to protect human, animal or plant life or health or to
avoid serious prejudice to the environment. ' 33 However, an invention can-
not be excluded "merely because the exploitation is prohibited
by... law."' 34 The inclusion of health would seem to suggest that this pro-
vision could be of utility in balancing patent rights against public health.
However, to date countries do not seem to have attempted to utilize this
provision to exclude subject matter from patentability for the purposes of
promoting public health. In addition, the provision is presumed to apply
only to specific inventions, rather than entire categories of inventions. 35
The inclusion of the phrase "ordre public" invokes fundamental principles
of society. Notably, similar language in previous patent laws has generally
failed to preclude patents on biotechnology on the grounds that the inven-
ments/Bilateral/AustraliaFTA/FinalText/SectionIndex.html (requiring patent protection for plants);
U.S.-Jordan Free Trade Agreement, art. 4(17)-(18), U.S.-Jordan, Oct. 24, 2000, 41 I.L.M. 63 (requiring
patent protection for plants).
31. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(3)(b); see also GERVAIS, supra note 30, at 227-34 (providing a
historical perspective of the text and noting that discussions of this provision have been among the
"most controversial" for the TRIPS council).
32. See generally Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural
Conflicts with Global Patent Policies, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 433 (2006) (providing a history of the
conflict, as well as current proposals).
33. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 27(2).
34. Id.
35. GERVAIS, supra note 30, at 250 (suggesting that compulsory licenses must be granted "only on
a case-by-case basis" since categorical licenses "would seem to violate this provision").
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tion was not objectionable to the entire society so that it violated ordre
public.36
B. Patent Rights
1. Exclusive Rights-Article 28
TRIPS provides that a patent confers on its owner "exclusive rights"
to prevent unauthorized persons from certain activities. In general, unau-
thorized individuals are precluded from making, using, selling, offering for
sale, or importing the patented product or process. 37 These rights are con-
sistent with existing patent law doctrine in Western countries that provide a
right to exclude others, but not an affirmative right to use.38 Although un-
stated in TRIPS, generally someone who desires to use his or her patented
invention must determine whether there is either a preexisting patent that
would bar use (without first obtaining a license), or whether there are addi-
tional laws with which the person must comply. For example, in most
countries, a patented drug typically cannot be sold without governmental
marketing approval. 39
The term of rights under TRIPS is a minimum of twenty years, calcu-
lated from the date of filing of the patent application. In other words, the
patent term is twenty years minus the time the Patent and Trademark Office
("PTO") takes to examine the application. 40 Although the examination
36. A similar exception under the European Patent Convention was held to require concrete
evidence of serious prejudice to the environment beyond speculation of possible harm. Greenpeace Ltd.
v. Plant Genetic Systems N.V., T 0356/93-3.3.4, 1995 O.J. E.P.O. 545, 18-19. In addition, the
exception may be further limited by the scope of the claimed invention-the formal language concern-
ing the legal scope of what is patented-as offensive; an invention can not be excluded from patentabil-
ity based on abstract conceptions of offensive uses, or even if offensive uses of the invention are
described in the patent, but not claimed. See In re Transgenic Plant/Novartis AG, G 0001/98, 1999 O.J.
E.P.O. I 1, 3.3.3.
37. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 28(l)(a). Moreover, for patented processes, the patent owner may
also exclude others from importing the product obtained "directly" from the patented process. Id. art.
28(1)(b).
38. E.g., 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000); id. § 154(a)(1).
39. In the United States, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") must approve all new drugs
before they can be sold in interstate commerce. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a). Similarly, in the EU, the European
Medicines Agency ("EMEA") must approve drugs before they are sold. See About EMEA-Structure,
http://www.emea.europa.eu/htms/aboutus/emeaoverview.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2007). In Canada,
Health Canada must approve drugs. See Health Canada, Drugs & Health Products, http://www.hc-
sc.gc.ca/dhp-mps/ prodpharma/index e.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2007).
40. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 33; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). The patent term period is an issue of
huge significance, as underscored by a separate WTO dispute involving the U.S. and Canada. See Panel
Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS170/R (May 5, 2000), affd, Appellate Body
Report, Canada-Term of Patent Protection, WT/DS I 70/AB/R (Sept. 18, 2000). Although Canada's
rules did not consistently provide a TRIPS-consistent patent term, its positive impact on speeding up the
introduction of generic drugs was not given much consideration by the WTO dispute panel. It instead
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period varies for different types of inventions, the average time is slightly
over two years, such that the average patent term is probably around seven-
teen to eighteen years, although it may be considerably shorter if the ex-
amination time is lengthy.4 1 Moreover, the effective patent term may be
shorter for patented pharmaceuticals that require a separate governmental
approval process. This is often the case, not because of government inac-
tion, but rather because the information required for regulatory approval
may not yet exist at the time that a patent application is filed. When this
occurs, there is a gap in the time periods between filing the application and
regulatory approval. 42 Although some countries provide "extensions" of
patent terms to make up for delays with either the patent examination proc-
ess or regulatory approval process, TRIPS imposes no such extension. 43 On
the other hand, such extensions are mandated under some TRIPS-plus
agreements, as discussed in the next section.
2. Exceptions to Patent Rights
Two explicit provisions of TRIPS articulate exceptions to the standard
patent rights. In particular, TRIPS permits a "limited exception" to patent
rights under Article 30, if certain, ambiguously stated requirements are
met.44 In addition, Article 31 of TRIPS also permits use without the author-
ity of the patent holder in cases where Article 30 is not met and more than
ten procedural conditions are satisfied. 45 Either of these provisions permits
an exception to the usual scope of patent rights-with respect to either the
exclusive rights over the patented invention or the patent term. However,
because each provision has some complexities, they will be separately dis-
cussed.
applied a very rule-based analysis in finding that Canada's rules must be changed, with the concomitant
result of extending the patent term of some blockbuster drugs and delaying entry of related generics.
41. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT: FISCAL
YEAR 2003, at 19 (2003) (noting average pendency to patent issuance or abandonment in 2003 as 26.7
months).
42. See, e.g., CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS
AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY ch. 4 (1998) (noting that the
average "effective" patent term is about eleven to twelve years); Center for Drug Evaluation and Re-
search, Frequently Asked Questions on the Patent Term Restoration Program,
http://www.fda.gov/cder/about/smallbiz/patentjterm.htm (last visited Mar. 15, 2007) (providing an
explanation of the effective patent term for pharmaceuticals is often shortened due to FDA require-
ments).
43. Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(b), 155-156 (2000) (providing for extensions of patent terms
based on the delay of the PTO or based on delays in regulatory review), with TRIPS, supra note 1, arts.
27-31 (providing no such patent right).
44. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 30.
45. Id. art. 31.
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a. Article 30-A "Limited Exception" to Patent Rights
Article 30 is a very short provision that on its face seems to provide a
means to balance the needs of rights owners against the needs of users,
especially because it specifically refers to the interests of parties beyond
patent owners.46 In particular, Article 30 provides, "Members may provide
limited exceptions to the exclusive rights conferred by a patent, provided
that such exceptions do not unreasonably conflict with a normal exploita-
tion of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests
of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third par-
ties." 47
Although member states initially had varied interpretations of the
scope of flexibility of this provision, such interpretations have been largely
limited by a WTO panel decision interpreting the scope of Article 30. In
Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products,4 8 a WTO panel
interpreted Article 30 as having three separate and distinct requirements,
which were cumulative in nature based on the interpretative guidelines of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding that governs all WTO agreements. 49
First, the panel interpreted the "limited exception" phrase to be a distinct
requirement separate from the rest of Article 30. To pass muster, an excep-
tion first must be very narrowly tailored from the general patent rights un-
der Article 28.50 Second, the limited exception must not "unreasonably
conflict with normal exploitation" of the patent. Third, the limited excep-
tion must not "unreasonably prejudice" the "legitimate interests of the pat-
ent owner," taking into account the "legitimate interests of third parties."
To best understand the WTO interpretation, a brief background of the
factual context may be helpful. Two provisions in Canada's patent law
were challenged as violating the patent owner's right to exclude all others
46. See, e.g., Correa, supra note 24, at 207-08 (noting that TRIPS Article 30 uses very general
wording, especially in comparison to more specific proposals that were made and rejected during the
negotiations process).
47. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 30.
48. Panel Report, Canada-Patent Protection of Pharmaceutical Products, WT/DS1 14/R (Mar.
17, 2000) [hereinafter Panel Report, Canada Generics].
49. The panel noted that the three separate elements must be "presumed to mean something
different" from each other or else there would be redundancy. Id. 7.20-21. In dissecting each re-
quirement, the panel noted that it was applying the customary international law for interpreting interna-
tional treaties, as mandated under WTO rules. See id. 4.13 n.40; DSU, supra note 3, art 3(2).
Customary rules include at least the interpretative rules under the Vienna Convention, which requires
that a treaty be interpreted in "good faith" in accordance with the "ordinary meaning" of the treaty
terms in their context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 3 1(1), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679.
50. In interpreting this exception, the panel relied on definitions from the Oxford English Diction-
ary to support its definition that there must be a very "narrow exception" that involves a "small diminu-
tion of the rights in question." Panel Report, Canada Generics, supra note 48, 7.30-.31 & n.393.
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from making the patented invention during the (Article 28) patent term.51
One provision, commonly known as the "regulatory review exception,"
enabled the manufacture of patented drugs during the patent term for the
purpose of obtaining regulatory approval for sale after patent expiry to
expedite the entry of generic drug marketers. 52 Although only Canada's
laws were challenged, 53 many WTO member states with similar legal pro-
visions based on the same policy of accelerating public access to lower-cost
generic drugs closely watched the case.54 The second provision, known as
the "stockpiling exception," enabled the same companies that qualified for
regulatory approval to manufacture unlimited quantities of the patented
drug during the last six months of the patent term; however, sales were not
permissible until the day the patent expired. 55
Although Canada conceded that its laws were facially inconsistent
with the Article 28 right to exclude requirements, Canada argued that the
provisions were "limited exceptions" permissible under Article 30.56 In
both instances, Canada argued that its laws were limited incursions on pat-
ent rights that were justified in promoting public health. In particular, by
permitting an exception for the manufacture of patented drugs for regula-
tory approval of generics, Canada could accelerate by several years the
Canadian public's access to cheaper drugs after the patent expired. In addi-
tion, Canada could prevent a de facto extension of the patent term that
would otherwise occur if a generic manufacturer had to wait until patent
expiry to obtain regulatory approval. As for the stockpiling provision, Can-
ada asserted its necessity, explaining that without the provision, consumers
would be forced to wait several months after the patent expired for manu-
facturers to start producing generic versions, resulting in an unfair, defacto
extension of the patent term.57
51. The EU cited three specific TRIPS provisions that were violated: the Article 28 right to ex-
clude, the Article 33 patent term, and the nondiscrimination requirement of Article 27. Id. 3.1.
52. Id. %7 2.1, 7.2 (citing Canadian Patent Act § 55.2(1)).
53. Indeed, Canada argued that there was an understanding during the TRIPS negotiations that the
regulatory review provision would be permissible under TRIPS, since negotiating members such as the
United States had such provisions in their laws and intended to keep them. Similarly, Canada argued
that similar laws adopted by member states after the conclusion of TRIPS provided further support
pursuant to principles of treaty interpretation that permit consideration of subsequent practice of the
parties. Id. 4.15.
54. Although WTO panel decisions technically have no stare decisis effect and are only binding
on parties to.the dispute, WTO members closely follow them and subsequent panels frequently rely
upon prior panel decisions, even if not legally required to do so.
55. Id. 2.1, 7.8-.10 (citing Canadian Patent Act § 55.2(2)).
56. Id. 7.12.
57. Id. 4.14, 7.12.
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The panel found that the regulatory review exception was a "limited
exception" under Article 30, but that the stockpiling exception was not.58 In
particular, it found that the regulatory review exception was a "limited
exception" because it was restricted to conduct necessary for regulatory
approval, with no commercial use made of resulting products. 59 On the
other hand, the panel found that the stockpiling provision was not appropri-
ately limited because of the lack of any limits on the quantity of produc-
tion. This finding resulted in the panel never contemplating the Article's
other two requirements, particularly whether the stockpiling provision in-
terfered with normal exploitation of the patent owner's rights.60
After finding that the regulatory review provision was appropriately
limited, the panel then considered the other two elements of the exception
before ultimately concluding that the regulatory review was a permissible
exception under Article 30. The panel concluded that the regulatory review
provision did not unreasonably conflict with "normal exploitation" 61 based
on its determination that normal exploitation did not include the de facto
exclusivity that would occur without the provision as a result of the time
needed to obtain regulatory approval to sell a patented drug.62 The panel
also found that the regulatory review period did not unreasonably prejudice
the "legitimate interests" of the patent owner. 63 The panel found that phar-
maceutical patent owners had no "legitimate interest" in maintaining an
effective patent term equivalent to that of patent owners who did not need
regulatory approval to make use of their respective inventions. 64
58. Id.78.1.
59. Id. 77.45.
60. Id. 77 7.34-36. The fact that the provision was limited with respect to only occurring in the
last six months of the patent term was not adequate. In addition, although the stockpiling provision as
written was considered to be impermissible, the panel left open the possibility that a stockpiling provi-
sion could be permissible if there were some limits set on the amount of production. Id. 7.37.
61. The panel once again looked to the dictionary definition of "normal" to conclude that the
normal practice for a patent owner would include the "more or less brief' period of market exclusivity
that typically exists after the patent expired. Id. 7.53-55.
62. Id. 7.56-57.
63. As a matter of interpretation, the panel referred initially to the common definition of "legiti-
mate" in evaluating the final prong of Article 30. Id. 7.68 (citing two definitions from the Oxford
Dictionary). The panel rejected the EC's attempt to equate legitimate interests with the full range of
legal interests under Article 28 as emasculating the final provision of Article 30. Id. The panel noted
that the exception was derived in part from the Beme Convention, which had slightly different interests
at issue, and concluded that the only sensible definition of "legitimate" must encompass more than
merely Article 28 interests. Id. 7.71.
64. The panel noted that "[o]n balance.., the interest claimed on behalf of patent owners whose
effective period of market exclusivity had been reduced by delays in marketing approval was neither so
compelling nor so widely recognized that it could be regarded as a 'legitimate interest' within the
meaning of Article 30 .... I Id. 7.82 (emphasis added). Moreover, the panel noted that although some
countries had regulatory review provisions at the time TRIPS was being negotiated, the fact that these
exceptions "were apparently not clear enough, or compelling enough, to make their way explicitly into
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, In addition to the findings specific to the legality of Canadian laws,
the WTO panel decision provided further insights into the balance between
patent rights and public health. First, the finding that the regulatory provi-
sion was compatible with TRIPS suggests that patent rights under TRIPS
are not absolute. Indeed, even though the stockpiling provision was deemed
incompatible, the panel decision left open the possibility that a differently
worded stockpiling provision could be permissible; for example, one that
limited production of the patented product by quantity, rather than merely
duration. 65 Although Canada elected to eliminate stockpiling altogether, the
panel's reception to a more narrowly tailored provision should not be over-
looked. The panel also hinted that the popular doctrine of experimental
use-providing researchers with the ability to use patented inventions in
the course of research-would be permissible under Article 30.66
On the other hand, despite a lengthy panel decision, the full scope of
flexibility allowed by Article 30 remained undefined. For example, the
panel never reached the question of how the interests of third parties (such
as consumers) should be balanced against the patent owners' interests-an
issue of obvious interest to many. In addition, the panel did not directly
address many of the arguments made by third parties concerning the utility
of using the TRIPS preamble-as well as Articles 7 and 8-to interpret
substantive provisions such as Article 30.
b. Article 31- "Other Use"
Article 31 applies to national legislation that permits unauthorized use
by the government, or third parties authorized by the government, in situa-
tions that do not fall under Article 30 and satisfy a long list of procedural
requirements. Many commentators refer to this provision as authorizing
compulsory licensing, although the term "compulsory licensing" does not
appear in the actual provision. 67 Generally, a state must attempt to negoti-
the recorded agenda of the TRIPS negotiations" suggested that they should not be considered part of the
legitimate interests. Stated differently, the panel noted that adjudication should not be utilized to decide
a "normative policy issue that is still obviously a matter of unresolved political debate." Id. Accord-
ingly, the panel concluded that it was not necessary to conclude what would constitute "unreasonable
prejudice," nor how third party interests should be balanced against the patent owner's legitimate
interests, other than to opine that legitimate interests must include something broader than legal inter-
ests. Id. 7.71.
65. See id. 7.30-36.
66. Id. 7.69 (noting that the panel purports to assert no opinion on the permissibility of experi-
mental use under Article 30, although it agrees with the "general meaning of the term legitimate inter-
est" contained in legal analysis involved in considering whether scientific experiments would be
legitimate interests).
67. See, e.g., UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 460-62 (2005);
Correa, supra note 24, at 208.
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ate for a license directly from the patent holder before imposing a compul-
sory license. 68 However, this negotiation may be waived in cases of "na-
tional emergency," or other circumstances of "extreme urgency" or "public
non-commercial use."'69 Although some initial controversy emerged con-
cerning what constitutes a national emergency under this provision, 70 the
2001 Doha Declaration on Public Health clarified that individual countries
have "the right to determine what constitutes a national emergency or other
circumstances of extreme urgency. ' 71 Moreover, it specifically noted that it
is "understood that public health crises, including those relating to
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a na-
tional emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
72
The exception to patent owner negotiation was recently an issue when
Thailand issued a five-year compulsory license for Merck's patented drug
Efavirenz, a common AIDS treatment for patients who develop immunity
68. TRIPS, supra note I, art. 3 1(b) (noting that compulsory use should not be permitted unless the
proposed user has first "made efforts to obtain authorization" for use from the patent owner on "reason-
able commercial terms" and those efforts have "not been successful within a reasonable period of
time").
69. Id. Even in cases where waiver of negotiations with the patent owner is applicable, the patent
owner must be notified of the use "as soon as reasonably practicable." Id.
70. For example, the use of compulsory licensing to address AIDS epidemics was initially chal-
lenged by the United States. However, roles became reversed when Canada and the United States
suggested using compulsory licensing to address an anthrax threat that clearly was not an actual epi-
demic. Geoff Dyer & Adrian Michaels, A Bitter Pill for Drug Makers, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 23,
2001, at 27 (noting a double standard between U.S. action concerning Cipro versus action against South
Africa and Brazil); Patent Abuse, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 22, 2001, at 20 (noting that "western
governments are guilty of double standards" in comparison of the eleven confirmed cases of anthrax
infection versus the 25 million people faced with dying of AIDS in Africa for lack of medical treat-
ment). Indeed, the timing of the anthrax threat in the fall of 2001 likely aided the unanimous agreement
on the Doha Declaration on Public Health since the U.S. and Canada were accused of hypocrisy in the
wake of the Doha negotiations. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, Drug Patent Dispute Poses Trade Threat:
Generics Fight Could Derail WTO Accord, WASH. POST, Oct. 26, 2001, at El (noting the global impli-
cations of the Cipro patent fight, including WTO negotiations scheduled to take place at Doha); Sarah
Boseley, Drug Dealing, GUARDIAN, Oct. 24, 2001, available at
http://education.guardian.co.uk/businessofresearch/ comment/0,,579977,00.html (comparing the three
anthrax deaths to the thousands of daily deaths in Africa from AIDS in the context of U.S. hypocrisy in
enforcing patents in developing countries such as South Africa).
71. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 5, 5(c).
72. Id. However, since this time, controversy concerning the scope of public health crises that
would justify the waiver of voluntary negotiations has continued. In particular, the U.S. has contended
that these are the only possible emergencies, while developing countries have argued for a broader
interpretation. See, e.g., MARY MORAN, RENEGING ON DOHA (2003), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/msfO52003.pdf; Brook K. Baker, Doha Redux-U.S. Enters New
Phase of Bad Faith Bargaining, CPTECH.ORG, July 2, 2003, http//www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/
hgap07022003.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); CPTech, Oxfam, & Third World Network, Deadlock
over Scope of Diseases Threatens to Kill Solution, CPTECH.ORG, Nov. 27, 2002,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/ngos1 1272002.html (last visited Feb. 13, 2007); Chakravarthi Ragha-
van, TRIPS Consultations on Implementing Doha Recessed, THIRD WORLD NETWORK, Nov. 29, 2002,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/5246a.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2007).
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to off-patent therapeutics. 73 Thailand asserted that it was within its WTO
rights to issue a compulsory license without prior negotiation to address its
own public health crisis, but Merck asserted that it was entitled to an initial
consultation period. 74 The situation became even more complex when
Thailand announced two additional compulsory licenses over the AIDS
drug Kaletra, as well as the heart drug Plavix.75 The compulsory license
regarding Plavix was particularly controversial to some who suggested that
heart disease could not satisfy the national emergency requirement. 76 How-
ever, TRIPS permits waiver of prior negotiation with the patent owner not
only where there is an emergency, but also for "public, noncommercial
use. '' 77 To address the criticism, Thailand issued a white paper to explain
73. Thail. Dep't of Disease Control, Ministry of Pub. Health, Announcement on the Public Use of
Patent for Pharmaceutical Products (Nov. 29, 2006) [hereinafter Thailand Announcement], available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thaicl4efavirenz.html.
74. See, e.g., Andrew Jack & Amy Kazmin, Thailand Breaks Patent for AIDS Drug to Cut Costs,
FIN. TIMES (London), Nov. 30, 2006, at 9. The United States Trade Representative Office also pres-
sured Thailand to withdraw the license. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Thailand Compulsory License on
AIDS Drug Prompts Policy Debate, IP-WATCH, Dec. 22, 2006, available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog /index.php?p=499 (noting that a source indicated the USTR had pressured Thailand
to withdraw the license, as well as more ambiguous quotes from USTR officials that they had not
provided "specific advice," but expected Thailand to "follow certain steps," with the suggestion that the
patent owner Merck should have first been contacted); Letter to Secretary of State Condeleeza Rice and
Ambassador Susan Schwab (Dec. 21, 2006), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand
/riceschwabthailand2 1 dec06.pdf (requesting that the USTR not pressure Thailand into negotiations with
patent holders before issuing compulsory licenses for manufacturing generic AIDS drugs). Several
members of congress also lobbied the USTR to "respect" the Thai government's actions and not to
intervene. Letter from Tom Allen et al. to Susan Schwab (Jan. 10, 2007), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/congressional-schwabletter-thailand-10janO6.pdf. The USTR
denied involvement, but suggested that Thailand should "respond to any requests for direct discussions
by concerned stakeholders, including, among others, the patent holder." Letter from Susan Schwab to
Thomas Allen (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/letter.pdf.
75. Thail. Dep't of Disease Control, Ministry of Pub. Health, Decree Regarding Exploitation of
Patent on Drugs & Medical Supplies by the Government on Combination Drug Between Lopinavir &
Ritonavir (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thai-cl-kaletra-en.pdf;
Thail. Dep't of Disease Control, Ministry of Pub. Health, Announcement Regarding Exploitation of
Drugs and Medical Supplies for Clopidogrel (Jan. 25, 2007), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/
health/c/thailand/thai-cl-clopidogrel-en.pdf.
76. See, e.g., Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Drug Company Reacts to Thai License; Government Ready
to Talk, IP-WATCH, Feb. 16, 2007, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=538&res
=1280&print=0 (noting that Sanofi-Aventis was surprised by the Plavix compulsory license since lack
of access would not constitute an "extreme emergency."); Bangkok's Drug War Goes Global, WALL
ST. J. (Asia), Mar. 7, 2007 (noting that "heart disease isn't a 'national emergency"'); Ronald A. Cass,
Thai Patent Turmoil, WALL ST J., Mar. 13, 2007 (suggesting that if treatment for heart disease is con-
sidered a national emergency, Thailand not only starts down a "slippery slope," but also sets "dangerous
precedent" for TRIPS that threatens "all intellectual property"); see also Pharmaceuticals: A Gathering
Storm, ECONOMIST.COM, June 7, 2007, http://www.economist.com/business/displaystory.
cfm?story-id=9302864 (last visited July 5, 2007) (noting that Joe Pender, of GlaxoSmithKline suggests
that while compulsory licenses are permissible under TRIPS, they are meant to be used as a "last resort"
in "limited circumstances, such as national health emergencies," and only after consultation with the
patent owner).
77. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 3 1(b); see also Medicines sans Frontieres, MSF's Response to Wall
Street Journal Editorial on Compulsory Licenses in Thailand (Mar. 12, 2007), available at
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its rationale behind the compulsory licenses. 78 Although Thailand contin-
ued to negotiate with the patent owner, controversy continued. Abbott
withdrew requests to register seven new medicines in Thailand, including a
heat-stable version of the AIDS drug Kaletra that would be well-suited to
the Thai climate. 79 In addition, Thailand was placed on the United States
Special 301 watch list.8 0 The report noted the compulsory licenses as "indi-
cations of a weakening of respect for patents. '' 81 Thailand's experience
suggests that despite the clear language in TRIPS, prior negotiation with
the patent owner is not required in all cases before a compulsory license is
issued; this step may nonetheless be expected.
Even when there is no question about prior negotiation with a patent
owner, countries may still encounter criticism for using compulsory li-
censes. For example, when Brazil invoked its first ever compulsory license
for the AIDS drug Efavirenz, the patent owner, Merck, admitted that there
were prior negotiations.8 2 Nonetheless, Merck issued a press release stating
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/openletters/wsj-03-12-2007.cfm (noting that "[i]t is
a common misunderstanding perpetuated by editorials like yours that [compulsory licenses] can only be
used in the case of an emergency"); KEI, Notes from March 16, 2007, U.S. Capitol Briefing on Thai-
land's Compulsory Licenses, available at http://www.keionline.org/index.php?option=com_ con-
tent&task=view&id=37 (providing summaries of speaker statements that reflect both the view that
Thailand's license of Plavix was permissible non-commercial use, as well as the opposing view that the
licenses were neither emergency nor non-commercial use).
78. Thail. Ministry of Pub. Health & Nat'l Security Office, Facts and Evidence on the 10 Burning
Issues Related to the Government Use of Patents on Three Patented Essential Drugs in Thailand (2007),
available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/c/thailand/thai-cl-white-paper.pdf; see also Martin
Vaughan, In Clash with Activists, Critics Charge Thailand Violation of Trade Rules, IP-WATCH, Mar.
19, 2007, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p =569&res=1 280&print=0
79. See, e.g., Bruce Jaspen, AIDS Controversy Dominates Abbot Labs' Annual Meeting, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 27, 2007; Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Thailand Presents Report on Compulsory Licensing
Experience, IP-WATCH, Mar. 12, 2007, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=563
&res=1280&print-0. After public criticism and controversy, Abbott did offer to directly sell Kaletra to
Thailand at a discounted rate, but did not change its decision to withhold other drugs from Thailand.
See, e.g., Nicholas Zamiska, Abbott's Thai Pact May Augur Pricing Shift, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2007;
Jaspen, supra (noting Abbott's continued decision to withhold drugs from Thailand despite protests at
Abbott's Annual Stockholders meeting); AIDS Activists Call for Boycott of Abbott Products, ABBOTT'S
GREED, Apr. 25, 2007, www.abbottsgreed.com/index.php?title=AIDSactivistscallfor.boycott.ofL
Abbott-products (last visited July 5, 2007) (noting calls for boycotts of Abbott products).
80. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVES, 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 27 (2007) [herein-
after 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT]. However, some members of Congress have suggested that Thailand's
priority status is unwarranted. See Letter from Henry A. Waxman et al. to Susan C. Schwab (June 20,
2007).
81. 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 80, at 27.
82. Press Release, Merck & Co., Statement on Brazilian Government's Decision to Issue Compul-
sory License for Stocrin (May 4, 2007), available at http://www.merck.com/newsroom/press- re-
leases/corporate/2007_0504.html [hereinafter Merck Statement on Brazil Licenses]. Public health
advocates, on the other hand, noted that Brazil's action demonstrates that issuing a compulsory license,
rather than merely threatening to do so-as Brazil had in the past-achieves the lowest price. See, e.g.,
Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Brazil Takes Steps to Import Cheaper AIDS Drug Under Trade Law, IP-




that Brazil's action is "not in the best interests of patients in Brazil and
around the world. '83 The press release made no mention of whether Bra-
zil's action was consistent with TRIPS; indeed, it did not mention TRIPS.
Rather, Merck characterized the compulsory license as an "expropriation of
intellectual property" that "sends a chilling signal to research-based com-
panies ... potentially hurting patients who may require new and innovative
life-saving therapies. '84 In addition, the Special 301 Report issued by the
USTR also criticized Brazil's discussion with patent holders. 85
Regardless of whether a country is entitled to avoid an initial consulta-
tion with a patent owner prior to compulsory licensing, that country must
always satisfy a number of other conditions according to TRIPS. 86 For
example, conditions governing the grant of a license include that use shall
be "considered on its individual merits, '87 and that the scope and duration
of the use must be "limited" to the authorized purpose. 88 Additional
mandatory procedural safeguards also exist in the form of judicial or other
independent review of the use authorization. 89 Even if the use is authorized,
it is contingent on "adequate remuneration" being paid to the patent holder.
Such remuneration must take into account the "economic value of the au-
thorization." 90 As with the review of the use authorization, remuneration
decisions are subject to judicial or other independent review. 91
Despite the long list of procedural requirements beyond initial consul-
tations, compliance with these requirements has not generally been an is-
sue. Although Thailand was strongly criticized for failing to negotiate with
patent owners prior to issuance of the compulsory license, whether the
licenses were granted for "limited" scope and duration relative to the pur-
pose of the compulsory license, and whether the remuneration was "ade-
quate" were not directly addressed. For example, is the license on efavirenz
until December 2011 limited in duration if AIDS is less of an issue before
83. Merck Statement on Brazil License, supra note 82.
84. Id.
85. 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 80, at 30 (noting that the "United States underscores
the importance of Brazil engaging in open and transparent discussions with all relevant stake-
holders.., in the interest of reaching mutually satisfactory outcomes").
86. In addition, other grounds include non-commercial use, dependent patents, and anti-
competitive practices. See TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 3 1 (a)-(I).
87. Id.art.31(a).
88. Id. art. 31 (c). For example, in the Thailand license of Efavirenz, the license is arguably limited
with respect to quantity since the license specifies that it is to be used on not more than 200,000 patients
per year and only for certain individuals. See Thailand Announcement, supra note 73.
89. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 3 1(i).
90. Id. art. 3 1(h). For example, Thailand considers a royalty rate of 0.5% of the total sale value to
be compliant. See, e.g., Thailand to Break HIV drug Patent, NATION, Nov. 30, 2006, available at
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/search/page.news.php?clid=2&id=30020346.
91. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 31(j).
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that time?92 Arguably the scope could be considered limited in that the
license states that it shall not exceed 200,000 patients entitled to medical
benefits-especially since national law provides for universal access to
essential medicine, as well as the fact that TRIPS only requires the license
to be limited relative to the purpose of the license.93 Also, is a royalty of
0.5 percent of the total sale value adequate? 94 Discussion of the Thai li-
censes has focused more on whether Thailand should be entitled to use any
compulsory licenses as a middle-income country, rather than on whether
the specific requirements of TRIPs are satisfied. In responding to concerns
of some members of Congress, Susan Schwab noted that "[w]e have not
suggested that Thailand has failed to comply with particular national or
international rules. ''95 Similarly, the Special 301 report that criticizes Thai-
land's compulsory licenses does not refer to any specific TRIPs provisions
that are violated.96
Prior to the compulsory licenses of Thailand and Brazil, the most con-
troversial requirement of Article 31 was that use be authorized "predomi-
nantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member authorizing
such use."'97 The controversy over this provision has primarily centered on
the inability of some developing countries, such as South Africa, to take
advantage of compulsory licenses because of a lack of sufficient manufac-
turing capacities, while other countries with strong generic manufacturing
industries, such as India, would be precluded from exporting inexpensive
drugs. The problem was first universally recognized in 2001 when member
states included a provision in the Doha Public Health Declaration explicitly
recognizing the problem and instructing the Council of TRIPS to find an
"expeditious solution" by the end of 2002.98 The Council did ultimately
provide a solution on the eve of a Ministerial Conference in Cancun in
August 2003. The solution consisted of a waiver of the domestic use re-
quirement together with additional procedural requirements. 99
The Council's waiver was crafted as a temporary solution that would
be replaced by an official amendment to TRIPS. Although the Council had
92. See Thailand Announcement, supra note 73.
93. Id.
94. Id. One commentator suggested that compulsory licenses generally provide "far less than a
reasonable economic return." Ronald A. Cass, Drug Patent Piracy, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2007.
95. Letter from Susan Schwab to Thomas Allen, supra note 74.
96. 2007 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, supra note 80, at 27 (suggesting that "the lack of transparency and
due process exhibited in Thailand represents a serious concern," without any mention of whether the
process actually violates any specific TRIPS provision).
97. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 31 (f).
98. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 5, $ 6.
99. 2003 General Council Decision, supra note 5, 2.
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hoped for adoption within six months, many member countries stymied
adoption of the initial waiver because of its perceived onerous procedural
requirements. In addition, a group of African countries submitted an alter-
native proposal to remove many of the waiver's procedural requirements-
a move welcomed by civil society and many other developing countries as
a constructive step forward.' 0 0 On the other side, industrialized countries
focused on limiting the set of diseases included for compulsory licens-
ing. 10 1 Ultimately, the original waiver was replaced with a proposed
amendment to TRIPS on the eve of the 2005 WTO Ministerial Conference
without any of the proposed changes. 10 2 The waiver remains in effect until
100. Communication from Nigeria on Behalf of the African Group, Implementation of Paragraph
II of the 30 August 2003 Decision, 3, IP/C/W/437 (Nov. 30, 2004); see also 2nd Ordinary Session of
the Conference of African Ministers of Health, Gaborone, Botswana, Oct. 10-14, 2005, Gaborone
Declaration: On a Roadmap Towards Universal Access to Prevention, Treatment and Care,
CAMH/Decl. 1(11), 4 (calling upon ministers of trade to seek a "more appropriate" permanent solution
that "removes all constraints, including procedural requirements" for the export and import of generic
medicines under TRIPS). In addition, in proposals that preceded the 2003 Council Decision, there were
simpler solutions proposed that focused on interpretations of Article 30. E.g., Proposal from a Group of
Developing Countries, Draft Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 9,
IP/C/W/312, WT/GC/W/450 (Oct. 4, 2001) (suggesting that under Article 30, members may "authorize
the production and export of medicines by persons other than holders of patents on those medicines to
address public health needs in importing Members"); see also Amir Attaran, The Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, Access to Pharmaceuticals, and Options Under WTO Law, 12
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 859, 868-70 (2002) (discussing the relative political ease
with which an Article 30 amendment can be made); Haochen Sun, A Wider Access to Patented Drugs
Under the TRIPS Agreement, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 101, 112-22 (2003) (discussing the strengths and
weaknesses of four alternative solutions involving Articles 30 and 31). However, this proposal was
rejected by scholars and countries. See, e.g., Second Communication from the United States, Paragraph
6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 31, IP/C/W/358 (July 9, 2002)
(suggesting that interpreting Article 30 to allow members to permit compulsory licenses to export
patented products would unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the patent owner); Frederick
M. Abbott, WTO TRIPS Agreement and Its Implications for Access to Medicines in Developing Coun-
tries 29 (Comm'n on Intell. Prop. Rights, Study Paper No. 2a, 2002) (suggesting that the Article 30
export solution might unreasonably prejudice the interests of the patent holder and thus fail to satisfy
Article 30); Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha "Solution, "
3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 52 (2002) (denying that developing countries had even suggested that they could
rely on Article 30). In addition, other options that were proposed initially included a moratorium on
disputes, as well as an amendment to Article 31. For an overview of these options, see Jacques H.J.
Bourgeois & Thaddeus J. Bums, Implementing Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on TRIPS and
Public Health: The Waiver Solution, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 835, 846-52 (2002).
101. See, e.g., MORAN, supra note 72, at 3.
102. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Implementation of Para-
graph II of the General Council Decision of 30 August 2003 on the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of
the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: Proposal for a Decision on an
Amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, IP/C/41 (Dec. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Proposed Paragraph 6
Amendment]. Part of the problem was that a debate over whether a statement read by the General Coun-
cil Chairman at the time the waiver was adopted-concerning eleven advanced developing countries
that intended to use the waiver only in cases of national emergency-should be part of a formal
amendment. See, e.g., Zoellick Vows to Work for TRIPS Deal, Lays Out U.S. Conditions, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Aug. 1, 2003, at 7, 7; WTO Members Re-Open Fight over Substance of TRIPS-Health Agree-
ment, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Mar. 12, 2004, at I, 18-19; see also WTO General Council, Minutes of
Meeting: Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, 29, WT/GC/M/82 (Nov. 13, 2003) (providing text of the original statement by General Coun-
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two-thirds of the membership ratifies the amendment (as is the case with
any TRIPS amendment), with the anticipated ratification date recently ex-
tended until 2009.103
The larger issue is that only a single country, Rawanda, has attempted
to use the waiver in the four years since it has been in effect. 104 Some have
suggested that the waiver has not been used because countries were uncer-
tain regarding its permanence. 105 The underutilized waiver could theoreti-
cally be a function of when the full impact of TRIPS requirements became
effective; some countries with strong generic production, such as India, did
not have patents on pharmaceuticals until 2005, such that compulsory li-
censing was not even a possibility.106 Moreover, even for WTO members
who have had full patent protection in place, enactment of domestic laws to
permit compulsory licenses for exportation has been slow. Only a handful
of countries have even modified their laws to enable compulsory licensing
cil Chairman). In addition, some countries were opposed to incorporating the 2003 waiver into an
amendment without further consideration of better alternatives in light of the fact that no country had
used the 2003 waiver. See, e.g., Joint statement by NGOs on TRIPS and Public Health: WTO Members
Should Reject Bad Deal on Medicines (Dec. 3, 2005), available at http://www.cptech.org/ip/wto/
p6/ngosl2032005.html (recommending that WTO members reject the proposal to adopt the 2003
amendment for its lack of workability, as well as failure to consider proposed alternatives); Ruth
Mayne, The Recent Agreement on WTO Patent Rules and Access to Medicines: A Flawed Deal?,
COURIER, Nov.-Dec. 2003, at 30. To supposedly resolve the debate, the General Council Chair re-read
the same statement that was read in 2003. See, e.g., Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, WTO Strikes Agreement
on TRIPS and Public Health on Eve of Ministerial, IP-WATCH, Dec. 6, 2005, available at
hrtp://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=168&print-l &res=1024&print-l; see also WTO Gen-
eral Council, Minutes of Meeting: Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 28-29, WT/GC/M/100 (Mar. 27, 2006).
103. Press Release, World Trade Org., Members OK Amendment to Make Health Flexibility
Permanent, Press/426 (Dec. 6, 2005); see also Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, art. X(3), Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1144 (1994) (providing for two-thirds voting require-
ment); William New, TRIPS Council Extends Health Amendment; Targets Poor Nations' Needs, IP-
WATCH, Oct. 23, 2007, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=798 (noting exten-
sion of ratification deadline from the end of 2007 to the end of 2009 after only II countries had adopted
it); see Ratification of TRIPS Health Amendment Languishes, With Five Months to Go, BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., June 27, 2007, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-06-
27/story4.htm (noting that only seven member states have ratified the amendment with less then six
months before the targeted goal).
104. World Trade Org., TRIPS and Public Health: Notifications by Importing WTO Members,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/public health_notifjimporte.htm (last visited Oct. 17,
2007); Laura Maclnnis, Rawanda Launches Key Test of WTO Drug Patent Waiver, REUTERS, July 20,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/healthNews/idUSL2088068720070720 (last visited Nov. 12,
2007); Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Rwanda Pioneers Use of WTO Patent Flexibility for HIV/AIDS Drug,
IP-WATCH, July 20, 2007, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=696&res
=1280&print=0.
105. See, e.g., Cecilia Oh, Will the TRIPS Amendment on Compulsory Licensing Work?, BRIDGES,
Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 22, 23.
106. Id. at 23; see also The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, 55
(India), available at http://www.ipindia.nic.in/ipr/patent/patent_2005.pdf.
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of drugs for export since the 2003 waiver. 107 In addition, much diversity
lies amongst the domestic enactment of laws, resulting in complexity be-
yond that already complained of in the WTO decision. For example, in
Canada, drugs for export must be included on a list of acceptable products.
The WTO requirement that both the importing and exporting countries be
involved creates barriers for organizations such as Doctors Without Bor-
ders, which would ordinarily prefer to purchase drugs directly from a sup-
plier. 108
Even if countries amend their laws to permit compulsory licenses for
export, there remain some serious hurdles to overcome. For a country to
import patented drugs, they must first be an "eligible importing member,"
which is defined as any least-developed country member, or a member that
has notified the TRIPS Council of its intention to use the system as an im-
porter. 109 Before importation occurs, the eligible importing member must
107. See, e.g., Use of Patented Products for International Humanitarian Purposes Regulations
(Patent Act) SOR/2005-143 (Can.) (amending Patent Act and implementing August 30, 2003, decision
of WTO General Counsel); Council Regulation 816/2006, Compulsory Licensing of Patents Relating to
the Manufacture of Pharmaceutical Products for Export to Countries with Public Health Problems, 2006
O.J. (L157/1) 1; The Patents (Amendment) Act 55 (India) (adding new section 92A); Consultation-
Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health in
Norwegian Law, Mar. 2, 2004, available at http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/Documents/
lover.regler/reglement/2004/Consultation--lmplementation-of-paragraph-6-of-the-Doha- Declaration-
on-the-TRIPS-Agreement-and-Public-Health.html?id=420597 (describing the addition of a paragraph to
the Patent Regulations of December 20, 1996 to state that "[a] compulsory licence shall be issued
mainly with a view to supplying the domestic market. The King may by regulations prescribe rules that
deviate from this."); Swiss Federal Inst. of Intellectual Prop., Conformation of Swiss Law to the WTO
Decision of 30 August 2003 Concerning the Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Nov. 23, 2005), available at http://www.ige.ch/E/ jur-
info/documents/j 10019e.pdf; Jung-Ae Suh & In H. Kim, Korea Revises Its Compulsory License Rules,
MANAGING INTELL. PROP., Nov. 2005, at 100; Ellen 't Hoen and Suerie Moon, China: State Intellectual
Property Office Order #37, http://cptech.org/ip/wto/p6/china-order37.html (Ia t visited Feb. 15, 2007)
(unofficial translation of Chinese Patent Act with commentary); see also Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen,
TRIPS Public Health Amendment Questioned; China Implements Decision, IP-WATCH, Dec. 14, 2005,
available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=178 (noting that China has implemented the
WTO waiver and now joins the EU, India, Norway, Korea, and the Netherlands as countries that have
implemented-or are on the verge of implementing-the waiver). In addition, the United States has
proposed, but not yet enacted any legislation. See Life-Saving Medicines Export Act of 2006, S.3175,
109th Cong. § 2(a) (2006).
108. Kiddell-Monroe, supra note 6.
109. Proposed Paragraph 6 Amendment, supra note 102, at 5, 1(b) (defining an eligible import-
ing member). Certain countries have stated that they will not use the system under any circumstances as
importing members; the noted members include Australia, Canada, EU and its member states, Japan,
New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States. Id. at 5, I(b) n.5. Other countries have
indicated that they would utilize the system only in extremely urgent or emergency situations, in par-
ticular China, Israel, Korea, Kuwait, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese Taipei, Turkey, and United
Arab Emirates. However, despite these stated agreements within the context of the WTO, some U.S.
senators have suggested that the U.S. position to never utilize compulsory licensing is an "untenable
position, especially in light of the current threat of an avian flu pandemic," and argued that the United
States should not foreclose the possibility of compulsory licensing in case of a public health emergency.
Waxman Letter, supra note 7, at 3-4.
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confirm that it lacks sufficient manufacturing capacity and intends to fol-
low the guidelines. 10 It must also specifically notify the TRIPS Council of
the name of the desired product, as well as the expected quantity, with the
information to be publicly available on a dedicated WTO webpage."II The
importing member must then hope that several other conditions beyond its
control exist. First, some other country must have amended its laws to en-
able compulsory licensing of patented drugs for export, and a manufacturer
in that country must be willing to manufacture drugs for export. Assuming
such a manufacturer exists, the exporting country must issue a narrowly
tailored compulsory license that provides "only the amount necessary" to
meet the requested needs, and the exported products must be "clearly iden-
tified" through "specific labelling or marking."' 12 Before these distinctly
packaged items may be exported, the manufacturer must post on a website
the exact quantities shipped, as well as any distinguishing features. Finally,
the exporting member country must specifically notify the TRIPS Council
of the licensed manufacturer and certain other details.' 13
C. Patent "Plus" Protection: Test Data
Beyond the specific patent provisions of TRIPS, Article 39 provides
protection from "unfair competition" with respect to "information" that is
provided to governmental agencies, but otherwise "undisclosed" to third
parties. In particular, Article 39 provides,
Members, when requiring, as a condition of approving the market-
ing of pharmaceutical or of agricultural chemical products which
utilize new chemical entities, the submission of undisclosed test or
other data, the origination of which involves a considerable effort,
shall protect such data against unfair commercial use. In addition,
Members shall protect such data against disclosure, except where
necessary to protect the public, or unless steps are taken to ensure
that the data are protected against unfair commercial use. 114
However, what is deemed "unfair competition" or "unfair commercial
use" has been subject to dispute since it is not explicitly defined. Multina-
tional pharmaceutical companies and the countries where such companies
dominate (such as the U.S. and EU) consider this term to preclude regula-
110. Proposed Paragraph 6 Amendment, supra note 102, at 5, 2(a)(ii); see also id. at 6, 3-4
(noting that eligible importing members shall take "reasonable measures" to prevent re-exportation of
products and provide "effective legal means" to prevent any importation not explicitly authorized under
the annex).
I 11. Id. at 5, 2(a)(i).
112. Id.at6, 2(b).
113. ld. at6, 2(b)-(c).
114. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 39(3).
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tory bodies from using any of the data submitted by an originator company
for a "reasonable" period of time; this interpretation results in delays in the
application and approval procedures for a generic version. 115 Others have
argued that the provision does not provide exclusive rights-and, indeed,
that such an approach was suggested and rejected in the TRIPS negotia-
tions-such that it should not bar regulatory agencies from relying on data
originally submitted by an originator company in deciding to approve a
generic version.' 16
A DSU panel has never clarified the precise parameters of this provi-
sion despite initial disputes alleging that it was violated.' 17 This require-
ment marks the first time an international standard was created to provide
protection for information that is not independently protected by patents or
any other type of intellectual property.1 8 For countries that are bound only
to TRIPS and not subject to Free Trade Agreements ("FTAs") that dictate
higher norms, the scope of Article 39 could remain important. 19 However,
for the many countries that are obligated by norms in FTAs, this article's
importance is primarily as a new norm in the international scheme. In par-
ticular, it provides a floor from which member countries have since argued
for higher and more specific requirements for protection of such regulatory
information. This is further described in the following section on TRIPS-
plus agreements. 12 0
115. See, e.g., Carlos Maria Correa, Unfair Competition Under the TRIPS Agreement: Protection of
Data Submitted for the Registration of Pharmaceuticals, 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 69, 77-78 (2002).
116. Id. at78.
117. The United States brought a formal case against Argentina for alleged failure to comply with
this provision, but the case failed to produce clear rules since it was ultimately settled after two years of
discussion. See World Trade Org., Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution According to the Condi-
tions Set Forth in the Agreement, WTIDS 171/3, WT/DS 196/4, IP/D/18/Add.1, IP/D/22/Add. I (June 20,
2002). However, for an interesting review of the background leading to the TRIPS provision, including
limitations to its interpretation, see generally Jerome H. Reichman, Undisclosed Clinical Trial Data
Under the TRIPS Agreement and Its Progeny: A Broader Perspective (presented at UNCTAD-ICTSD,
Dialogue on Moving the Pro-Development IP Agenda Forward: Preserving Public Goods in Health,
Education and Learning, Nov. 29-Dec. 3, 2004), available at http://www.iprsonline.org/ uncta-
dictsd/bellagio/dialogue2004-2/bell4_.documentation.htm.
118. E.g., GERVAIS, supra note 30, at 274 (noting that TRIPS is the first multilateral agreement to
address the issue).
119. Indeed, India is currently facing this issue. For a thorough and thoughtful discussion of various
interpretations of Article 39(3), see TAHIR AMIN ET AL., THE IMPACT OF ARTICLE 39.3 IN INDIA: A
PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE (2006), available at http://imak.org.googlepages.com/1-MAKArticle39.pdf.
120. In addition, the existence of TRIPS-plus agreements that dictate higher standards has pro-
moted arguments for interpreting this provision to create a liability-based regime where generic applica-
tions could be submitted and some compensation is provided to the patent owner. See id. atI 1-17.
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II. TRIPS-PLUS
The most significant development in the decade since TRIPS was
signed is the proliferation of "TRIPS-plus" agreements that require member
countries to embrace standards of intellectual property that go beyond
TRIPS. In general, these are bilateral or regional FTAs negotiated between
a major industrialized country (such as the U.S. or Canada) and a develop-
ing country. 121 In addition, industrialized countries are not immune-
Australia has also signed a FTA that may impede its historic ability to pro-
vide relatively low cost drugs to its citizens. 122 As with the WTO Agree-
ment (of which TRIPS is a part), these subsequent agreements involve
countries agreeing to higher intellectual property standards as part of a
bargain for increased market access. Although negotiations over TRIPS-
plus agreements continue, counter-trends aiming to highlight the health
implications of such agreements have evolved. Before the counter-trends
are discussed further, however, this section provides an overview of the
types of TRIPS-plus requirements that are presently being imposed. In
particular, this part highlights some typical requirements of FTAs regarding
patentability, patent rights, and data protection. 123
121. To a lesser extent, there are also bilateral investment agreements that require intellectual
property standards or condition trade benefits on the level of intellectual property rights in force. See,
e.g., Andean Trade Preference Act, 19 U.S.C. § 3202(d)(9) (2000); Caribbean Basin Economic Recov-
ery Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2702(c)(9). In addition, a committee under the auspices of WIPO is negotiating a
draft treaty on standards of patentability, the Substantive Patent Law Treaty ("SPLT"). Standing Com-
mittee on the Law of Patents, Draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty, WIPO Doc. SCP/9/2 (Mar. 3, 2003)
[hereinafter SPLT Treaty]; see also WIPO Moves Toward "World" Patent System, GRAIN, July 2002, at
3, available at http://www.grain.org/briefings-files/wipo-patent-2002-en.pdf (noting that if successful,
the SPLT "could make.. .TRIPS... obsolete" to the extent that TRIPS only provides the minimum,
whereas the SPLT "will spell out the top and the bottom line"). However, discussions have largely
stalled on that agreement, so it is not a focus of this section, although it is discussed in the next section
on countering TRIPS-plus trends, since a primary reason for the current stalemate in negotiations relates
to opposition to its TRIPS-plus standards. See, e.g., Standing Committee on the Law of Patents, Sum-
mary by the Chair, 7, WIPO Doc. SCP/10/10 (May 14, 2004). According to the summary of the Chair
of the Committee, a number of delegations expressed support for the proposal, but others opposed the
proposal, "emphasizing the need to consider... the interrelationship of those provisions... such as the
disclosure of the origin of genetic resources and traditional knowledge, public health, patentability
criteria and the general exceptions." Id.
122. See Australia FTA, supra note 30, art. 17.
123. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, art. 17.9, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003 [hereinafter Chile FTA],
available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/ChileFTA/FinalText/Section_ In-
dex.html; Free Trade Agreement, art 15.9, U.S.-Morocco, June 15, 2004 [hereinafter Morocco FTA],
available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/MoroecoFTA/FlnalText/Section_
Index.html. In addition, some agreements do not set specific requirements, but rather mandate adoption
of the "highest international standards" of intellectual property rights. See, e.g., Euro-Mediterranean
Agreement, Eur. Cmty.-Morocco, art. 39, Feb. 26, 1996, 2000 O.J. (L 70) 2, 11; Agreement on Trade,




Whereas TRIPS allowed countries flexibility in defining the terms of
patentability to meet their individual needs, subsequent FTAs infringe on
that flexibility. For example, TRIPS explicitly notes that member states
may choose to exclude medical procedures and treatments from patentabil-
ity, but TRIPS-plus agreements may eliminate this option. 124 Patents on
medical treatments can substantially increase the cost of health care and its
accessibility. In the United States, where there is no such exclusion from
patentability, health care costs are a major issue, with some physicians (and
patients) complaining about the negative impacts patents have on medical
treatment. 125
Also, whereas TRIPS allows countries to define what constitutes
"new" and "patentable," some TRIPS-plus agreements explicitly limit na-
tional discretion to define these terms. For example, some agreements spec-
ify that a new use of a previously known compound is per se patentable
subject matter. 126 The United States permits patents on new uses of such
compounds, without regard for their impact on public health. 127 In addition,
some agreements provide that an invention may be considered novel even
if it was publicly disclosed prior to the patent application by the inven-
tor. 128 While this is consistent with United States law, it is a more permis-
124. For example, the draft SPLT similarly contains no such exceptions. See SPLT Treaty, supra
note 121, art. 2; see also IPR Text Proposed by U.S. to Thailand, Patents, sec. 2(b) (2006), [hereinafter
Draft Thailand FTA], available at http://bilaterals.org/article-print.php3?id-article=3677 (explicitly
requiring patents be granted on medical treatments and procedures).
125. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ho, Patents, Patients, and Public Policy: An Incomplete Intersection at
35 U.S.C. § 287(c), 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 601 (2000). Indeed, even some Justices of the Supreme
Court were sufficiently disturbed by the impact of patent rights on public health that they sua sponte
suggested that the scope of patentable subject matter be reconsidered in a case where no party had ever
raised this issue. Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., No. 04-607, slip op. at 14-15 (U.S. June
22, 2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting from dismissal of certiorari petition).
126. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Oman, art. 15.8(1)(b), Jan. 19, 2006 [hereinafter Oman
FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Oman-FTA/FinalText/Section
Index.html (stating that the agreement "confirms that.., patents [are] available for... known prod-
uct[s] ... for the treatment of particular medical conditions"); U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, art.
18.8(1), U.S.-Korea, June 30, 2007 [hereinafter Korea FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/ as-
sets/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Republic.of KoreaFTA/DraftText/assetcuploadfile273_ 12717.pd
f (stating that "each Party confirms that patents shall be available for any new uses or methods of using
a known product").
127. See35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2000).
128. See, e.g., U.S.-Pan. Trade Promotion Agreement, art. 15.9(7), U.S.-Pan., June 28,2007 [here-
inafter Panama TPA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/ Pa-
namaFTA/Draft_Text/assetupload.filel3l10350.pdf (noting that public disclosures by the inventor
within one year of application shall not be considered in assessing whether the invention is novel or has
an inventive step); Korea FTA, supra note 126, art. 18.8(7) (noting that public disclosures "made or
authorized by, or derived from, the patent applicant" within one year of the patent application shall be
disregarded in assessing novelty and inventive step).
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sive standard, resulting in more patents-which could negatively impact
public health-than what TRIPs requires. 129
National ability to assess patentability is also limited in some FTAs
through provisions that limit the ability for thorough review of patent ap-
plications. In particular, some FTAs specifically restrict countries from
permitting third parties to oppose the issuance of patents until after the
patent is granted. 130 Not only might this result in more patent issuances, but
if issued patents have a presumption of validity, and patents will also be
more difficult to challenge.
B. Patent Rights
There are several aspects of patent rights that are generally extended
through TRIPS-plus agreements. For one, many (if not most) agreements
extend the patent term, slowing the availability of lower cost generic drugs.
Other agreements limit compulsory licensing during the patent term, taking
away a traditional tool nations utilize to address public health concerns
during the patent term. These agreements may compromise the availability
of generic drugs during a health crisis, which could lead to a major problem
if present fears of global pandemics, such as avian flu, become realized.
Still other agreements limit parallel imports-the ability of a country to
import a patented drug that was previously the subject of an authorized sale
in another country-as a way to purchase patented drugs at the lowest pos-
sible cost.
While large pharmaceutical companies allege that data protection is
necessary to recoup the investment in creating the clinical data they submit,
the data protection necessarily delays the availability of generic drugs if
manufacturers of generic drugs are not permitted to rely on similar data. 131
The patent owner and originator of the data may suggest that generic manu-
facturers are not impeded since they could create their own clinical data.
However, generic manufacturers typically operate on slim profit margins
since they do not own patents, but rather, they manufacture and sell off-
patent drugs in open competition with other generic companies, as well as
129. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (providing a grace period for disclosures that exist one year prior to the
patent application).
130. See, e.g., Korea FTA, supra note 126, art. 18.8(4) (noting that if opposition proceedings are
provided to third parties, "the Party shall not make such proceedings available before the grant of the
patent").
131. This is particularly significant given that developing and marketing a new drug costs an
average of 800 million dollars and takes ten to fifteen years to complete. See INT'L FED'N PHARM.
MFRS. & ASs'Ns, A REVIEW OF EXISTING DATA EXCLUSIVITY LEGISLATION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES,
at intro. (4th rev. ed. 2005).
2007]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
the patent owner. From a public health perspective, permitting a second
company to rely on existing clinical data on efficacy, rather than forcing
the second company to generate its own expensive data would enable a
generic manufacturer to enter a market and provide lower cost drugs to
consumers.
132
The patent term in many TRIPS-plus agreements goes beyond the
TRIPS requirement of twenty years from the date of application (minus the
period of examination). In particular, many agreements allow for extension
of the patent term if there are "unreasonable delays" in the patent examina-
tion. 133 "Unreasonable delays" may be as few as four years from the date of
filing or two years from the request for examination. 134 Some agreements
also allow for a further extension of a patent term for activity that occurs
outside the patent office. For example, some require an extension of the
patent term if marketing approval for sale of a patented drug results in "un-
reasonable curtailment" of the effective patent term. 135 The required patent
term extensions under TRIPS-plus agreements essentially provide protec-
tion to pharmaceutical patent owners that the WTO panel considered be-
yond the scope of patent rights in the Canada-Patent Protection of
Pharmaceutical Products decision. 136 Although that decision focused on
whether generic manufacturers were liable for making the patented inven-
tion during the patent term for regulatory approval, in the course of ad-
dressing this ultimate issue, the panel found that there was no "legitimate
interest" for pharmaceutical patent owners to maintain an effective patent
term equivalent to that of patent owners who did not need regulatory ap-
proval to make use of their inventions. 137 However, for countries that are
132. In addition, it may be arguably unethical to even require patients to undergo duplicative tests
where scientific protocol would require some patients be precluded from obtaining known therapeutic
treatment if they were in a "control" group.
133. See, e.g., Oman FTA, supra note 126, art. 15.8(6)(a); Trade Promotion Agreement, U.S.-Peru,
art. 16.9(6)(a), Apr. 12, 2006 [hereinafter Peru TPA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/
TradeAgreements/Bilateral/PeruTPA/Final Texts/Section_Index.html; Australia FTA, supra note 30,
art. 17.9(8)(a); Korea FTA, supra note 126, art. 18.8(6)(a) (defining "unreasonable delay" as including
a period of more than four years from the date of filing of an application).
134. See, e.g., Peru TPA, supra note 133, art. 16.9(6)(a). Alternatively, others define unreasonable
delay as four years from filing or two years from a request for examination, whichever is later. See, e.g.,
Australia FTA, supra note 30, art. 17.9(8)(a); Oman FTA, supra note 126, art. 15.8(6)(a).
135. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., art. 16.8(4)(a), May 6, 2003 [hereinafter Singa-
pore FTA], available at http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Singapore_FTA/ Fi-
nalTexts/Section lndex.html; Chile FTA, supra note 123, art. 17.10(2)(a); CAFTA, supra note 30, art.
15.9(6)(b); Korea FTA, supra note 126, art. 18.8(6)(b). Similarly, where countries allow marketing
approval based upon approval in another country, a patent term extension may be required in some
cases based upon a delay in that other country's approval process. See, e.g., Singapore FTA, supra, art.
16.7(8).
136. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
137. The panel noted that "[o]n balance.., the interest claimed on behalf of patent owners whose
effective period of market exclusivity had been reduced by delays in marketing approval was neither so
1498 [Vol 82:3
A NEW WORLD ORDER
members to TRIPS-plus agreements, this panel finding is defacto inappli-
cable.
Recent FTAs also provide de facto patent term extensions in other
ways. For example, some FTAs entitle the patent owner to a commercial
monopoly if the patent term expires before the period of data protection. 138
In addition, other FTA provisions delay the approval of generic drugs by
precluding reliance on information submitted for marketing approval dur-
ing the term of the patent. 139
1. Limited Compulsory Licensing During Patent Term
FTAs also limit compulsory licensing beyond TRIPS. Whereas TRIPS
does not specify the grounds under which compulsory licensing may be
permitted, and the Doha Public Health Declaration purports to leave this
matter within the discretion of national authorities, currently negotiated
TRIPS-plus agreements limit circumstances under which developing na-
tions may issue compulsory licenses authorizing generic manufacturers to
produce lower cost versions of patented drugs. 140 The Singapore agree-
ment, for example, limits compulsory licensing to remedying anti-
competitive behavior, public non-commercial use, and national emergen-
cies. 14 1 In addition, the compensation due patent owners is "reasonable and
entire" compensation, rather than "adequate compensation" under
TRIPS.142 Moreover, some FTAs entirely omit any provision that is analo-
gous to the compulsory licensing provision of TRIPS Article 31; rather, the
compelling nor so widely recognized that it could be regarded as a 'legitimate interest' within the
meaning of Article 30." Panel Report, Canada Generics, supra note 48, 7.82 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the panel noted that although some countries had regulatory review provisions at the time
TRIPS was being negotiated, the fact that these exceptions "were apparently not clear enough, or
compelling enough, to make their way explicitly into the recorded agenda of the TRIPS negotiations"
suggested that they should not be considered part of the legitimate interests. Id. Stated differently, the
panel noted that adjudication should not be utilized to decide "a normative policy issue that is still
obviously a matter of unresolved political debate." Id.
138. See. e.g., Korea FTA, supra note 126, art. 18.9(4); U.S.-Colom. Trade Promotion Agreement,
art. 16.10(2), U.S.-Colom., Nov. 22, 2006 [hereinafter Colombia TPA], available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Colombia FTA/Final-Text/asset-uploadfile7
7610142.pdf.
139. See, e.g., Peru TPA, supra note 133, art. 16.10.2; Columbia TPA, supra note 138, art, 16.10.2;
Panama TPA, supra note 128, art. 15.10.2.
140. In particular, the agreement stated that "[e]ach Member has the right to grant compulsory
licenses and the freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are granted." Doha Public
Health Declaration, supra note 5, 5(b).
141. Singapore FTA, supra note 135, art. 16.7(6)(a) (anti-competitive practices); id. 16.7(6)(b)
(public non-commercial use or national emergencies).
142. Id. art. 16.7(6)(b)(ii); see also Free Trade Area of the Americas, Third Draft Agreement, ch.
XX, subsec. B.2.e, art. 6.1 (c), Nov. 21, 2003, FTAA.TN/w/133/Rev.3 [hereinafter FTAA] (also requir-
ing "reasonable and entire compensation").
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only exception to patent rights is a provision similar to the more ambiguous
TRIPS Article 30.143
Even for FTAs that do not have provisions explicitly governing com-
pulsory licensing, other provisions may impede such use of patented inven-
tions. In particular, compulsory licensing may be a non-issue if a generic
drug company cannot obtain the regulatory approval necessary because of
data protection rules that prevent the generic company from relying on the
data of the patent owner. Although TRIPS does provide protection for in-
formation submitted by a patent owner to government agencies for regula-
tory approval, it is only against "unfair commercial use." 144 In subsequent
agreements, the scope of protection is more explicit and expansive.
Whereas TRIPS does not provide any timing requirements, most subse-
quent agreements mandate that no one other than the originator of the in-
formation can use it for five to ten years. 145 During this time, the patent
owner de facto becomes the only possible manufacturer and seller of pat-
ented drugs, with the concomitant result of higher priced drugs to consum-
ers. In addition, the period of de facto monopoly to the patent owner may
be increasing. For example, in one of the most recent agreements, Russia
appears to have agreed to protect undisclosed test data for at least six years.
This agreement also suggests that the data is barred from public non-
commercial use, although TRIPS explicitly requires only that such infor-
mation be protected against unfair commercial use. 146
143. See, e.g., Korea FTA, supra note 126, art. 18.8(3), Panama TPA, supra note 128, art. 15.9(3);
Colombia TPA, supra note 138, art. 16.9(3) (providing for "limited exceptions" to the patent rights in a
manner similar to TRIPS Article 30, but without any mention of other uses similar to TRIPS Article
31).
144. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 39(3); see also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 1711(6), U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17,
1992, 32 I.L.M. 289 (1993) (requiring member states to provide protection to test data for a "reason-
able" time, which is explicitly defined as lasting at least five years); Chile FTA, supra note 123, art.
17.10(1) (requiring five years of data protection of pharmaceutical products that use a "new chemical
entity"); Singapore FTA, supra note 135, art. 16.8(2) (requiring five years of protection for test data of
pharmaceutical products-a category perceived as broader than new chemical entities); CAFTA, supra
note 30, art. 15(10) (providing five years of protection for pharmaceutical products); FTAA, supra note
142, ch. XX, subsec. B.2.j, art. 1.2 (providing for at least five years of non-reliance on test data for
marketing approval); Oman FTA, supra note 126, art. i5.9(l)(a) (providing at least five years for
pharmaceuticals and ten years for agricultural chemical products); Peru TPA, supra note 133, art.
16.10(1)(a) (providing at least five years for pharmaceuticals and ten years for agricultural chemical
products); Australia FTA, supra note 30, art. 17.10 (providing at least five years for new pharmaceuti-
cal products and ten years for agricultural chemical products).
146. See, e.g., Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Results of Bilateral Negotiations on Rus-
sia's Accession to the WTO: Action on Critical IPR Issues (Nov. 19, 2006), available at
http://ustr.gov/assets/DocumentLibrary/FactSheets/2006/asset-upload-file 15 l9980.pdf; Russian
Accession: New Potential Hurdle with EU; TRIPS-plus IP Commitments with US, BRIDGES WKLY.
TRADE NEws DIG., Nov. 29, 2006, at 4, 5.
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2. Limits on Parallel Imports
Restrictions on parallel imports-imports of patented drugs previously
subject to an authorized sale in another country-constitute a major differ-
ence between TRIPS and subsequently negotiated trade agreements. Before
delineating the differences, it is first important to clarify the concept of
parallel imports and their significance to public health interests.
Permitting parallel importation (alternatively referred to as the doc-
trine of international exhaustion) 147 favors consumer interests and access to
medicine, because countries are free to import products from the country
where they are legitimately sold for the lowest possible price. Pharmaceuti-
cal manufacturers are strongly opposed to international exhaustion since
their business model relies upon price differentiation amongst different
countries. If consumers could freely buy the cheapest product available,
companies would not be able to discriminate amongst different markets.
At the time of the TRIPS negotiation, the topic of parallel importation
was hotly contested. 148 While countries hotly debated whether to explicitly
permit or prevent parallel imports, the final agreement merely states that
the topic will be excluded for the purposes of dispute settlement under
WTO proceedings. 149 In addition, the recent Doha Public Health Declara-
tion states that TRIPS is intended to "leave each Member free to establish
its own regime for such exhaustion without challenge."' 150
While member countries may continue to debate whether TRIPS con-
trols the issue of parallel imports, some countries have utilized TRIPS-plus
agreements to obtain a clear bar against use of parallel imports. Some of
these agreements prohibit developing countries from importing patented
drugs from countries that sell them at the lowest price; that is, they prohibit
parallel importation and reject the principle of international exhaustion. For
example, the U.S.-Singapore and U.S.-Morocco Free Trade Agreements
147. According to the concept of intemational exhaustion, once a legal copy of a patented product
is circulated (i.e., with permission of the patent holder) somewhere in the world, patent rights for that
product are exhausted, such that the patent owner cannot protest subsequent importation of the patented
product to a different country. This concept stems from the more universally recognized principle of
domestic exhaustion, or doctrine of first sale. Essentially, within an individual country, the first sale of a
patented product exhausts the patent owner's rights regarding that product. The duly authorized pur-
chaser of the product may then use or dispose of the product as he or she wishes, including re-selling it.
In addition, in the case of the European Union, the domestic exhaustion principle is extended through
the entire European Community such that a single authorized sale of a patented product anywhere
within the European Community exhausts the patent owner's rights with regard to that product.
148. See GERVAIS, supra note 30, at I11-15.
149. TRIPS, supra note 1, art. 6 (providing that "[f]or the purposes of dispute settle-
ment.., nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intellectual
property rights").
150. Doha Public Health Declaration, supra note 5, 5(d).
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limit parallel importation by requiring member countries to provide patent
holders with the means to block importation of patented drugs if it violates
a distribution agreement.15 1
C. Tension Within TRIPS-Plus Agreements and Negotiations
Although the next section focuses exclusively on activity that counters
the TRIPS-plus trend, some elements within the existing and pending
agreements indicate a possible trend against automatic adoption of new
TRIPS-plus norms.
In addition to the specific changes to patentability and patent rights,
certain notable elements are not included in many TRIPS-plus agreements.
Importantly, the objectives and principles of TRIPS, as stated in Articles 7
and 8 of TRIPS, are generally not included in any of the FTAs. Their omis-
sion could be important, because whereas the TRIPS requirements are to be
interpreted in light of the objectives and principles of Articles 7 and 8, no
similar interpretative framework supporting public health exists in the
FTAs. In light of this omission, some countries have tried to reinstitute the
thrust of the two articles with side letters to TRIPS-plus agreements that
declare some type of right to consider public health. 152 Noble as these ef-
forts may be, they may not allow countries to take full advantage of flexi-
bilities under TRIPS and the Doha Public Health Declaration, because the
interpretative weight of side letters will likely be minimal even if they con-
tain similar language. 153
However, in a very important new development, some previously ne-
gotiated FTAs between the U.S. and other countries are expected to now
151. Singapore FTA, supra note 135, art. 16.7(2)-(3); Morocco FTA, supra note 123, art. 15.9(4);
see also FTAA, supra note 142, ch. XX, subsec. B.2.e, art. 7.1 (technically permitting parallel imports,
but requiring members to review their domestic laws "with a view to adopting at least the principle of
regional exhaustion" within five years).
152. See Understanding Regarding Certain Public Health Measures, Aug. 5, 2004, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-DR -Final -Texts/asset-
upload-file697_3975.pdf (understanding of chapter fifteen of CAFTA, supra note 30); Understandings
Regarding Certain Public Health Measures, Apr. 12, 2006, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assetsfTrade-Agreements/BilateralUPeru-TPA/Final-Texts/asset-upload-file485_9
506.pdf (understanding of chapter sixteen of the Peru TPA, supra note 133); Letters between Minister
Taib Fassi Fihri, Delegate for Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Kingdom of Morocco, and Robert B.
Zoellick, Trade Representative, United States (June 15, 2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Morocco-FTA/Flnal-Text/asset-upload-file25
893852.pdf (courtesy translation of the understanding of chapter fifteen of the Morocco FTA, supra
note 123).
153. See RUTH MAYNE, REGIONALISM, BILATERALISM, AND "TRIP PLUS" AGREEMENTS: THE
THREAT TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 7 (2005) (suggesting that the impact of side letters "will be at best
to muddy the ability of countries to use the TRIPS flexibilities confirmed by the Doha Declaration and
the WTO August 30th decision on access to medicines, and at worst undermine their implementation").
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incorporate such language within the main text of the agreements, rather
than merely in side letters. In particular, the United States Trade Represen-
tative announced new trade rules for FTAs with developing countries that
aim to strike a better balance between promoting innovation and public
health rights. 154 The new rules are to apply to pending agreements with
Peru and Panama; but not to Korea and Russia. 155 Although the actual lan-
guage of the FTAs remains to be both crafted and approved by Congress
(as well as the other countries), Congress did provide a bilateral agreement
of principles, including the fact that the "side letter" currently included as
part of the noted FTAs should be made a part of the text of the FTAs. 156
Although the bipartisan agreement to scale back intellectual property
provisions is certainly a major development, the ultimate details may not
provide substantial change from the original text. Many of the agreed
changes are relatively modest. For example, instead of mandating that pat-
ent terms be extended for "unreasonable delay" in either patent or market-
ing approval, the new proposal states that Peru and Panama may do so. 157
However, although may seems less restrictive than the original wording of
"shall," the new proposal also contains new language that requires Peru and
Panama to make "best efforts" to be expeditious. 158 Thus, this seems to at
least leave the door open to criticism and pressure if patents or marketing
approvals are not granted in the fashion desired by major pharmaceuticals.
Similarly, although the new proposal no longer requires the national drug
approval agency to withhold approval of generic drugs unless the agency
can certify that no patent rights are violated, there are now new rules that
procedures and remedies must exist for "expeditiously adjudicating"
whether a patent is infringed. 159 In addition to these examples, there is the
154. Letter from Charles Rangel & Sander Levin to Susan Schwab (May 10, 2007).
155. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Trade Facts-Intellectual Property (May 2007)
(noting that modified provisions relating to medicines and health only apply to "developing country
partners"). In addition, the pending agreement with Colombia may ultimately join Peru and Panama, but
is currently stalled because of violence against trade unionists. See Letter from Charles Rangel &
Sander Levin, supra note 154.
156. The document states that parties
(I) would affirm their commitment to the Doha Declaration, (2) clarify that the Chapter does
not and should not prevent the Parties from taking measures to protect public health or from
utilizing the TRIPS/health solution, and (3) include an exception to the data exclusivity obli-
gation for measures to protect public health in accordance with the Doha Declaration and sub-
sequent protocols for its implementation.
Peru & Panama FTA Changes 8 (May 10, 2007), available at http://www.cpath.org/sitebuildercontent/
sitebuilderfiles/2007 new trade-policy-details5-10-07.pdf.
157. Id. at 7.
158. Id.
159. Id at 7-8.
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possibility of a general addition to the agreements that could require peri-
odic review of the national intellectual property rights. 160
The most notable change to the FTAs, beyond the fact that there was a
scaling back of the FTAs' terms, is probably the change in status of the
initial side letters on public health. The new proposal directly addresses the
previous criticism of the side letters-namely, that they failed to provide
adequate legal protection because they were not official parts of the agree-
ment. 161 The revised FTAs should now affirm commitment to the Doha
Public Health Declaration, as well as contain some language to clarify that
the FTA "does not and should not prevent the Parties from taking measures
to protect public health or from utilizing the TRIPS/health solution."'162 On
the other hand, having similar language in the WTO/TRIPS context, as well
as in United States laws, has not ended United States pressure on countries
that attempt to use TRIPS flexibilities. 163
Another potentially important development to the TRIPS-plus move-
ment beyond the activities described in the next section is the stalling of
some FTAs that were previously in negotiation. For example, the United
States was unsuccessful in completing the Andean FTA and resorted to
negotiating individual agreements with individual countries. The United
States has successfully concluded agreements with Peru and Columbia, but
has not yet done so with Ecuador or Bolivia. 164 While some may perceive
this piecemeal approach dangerous to the leveraging position of developing
countries, it can also be viewed more optimistically as progress to the ex-
tent that the United States cannot easily replicate identical agreements with
the countries of its choice. 165 In addition, the Free Trade Agreement of the
160. Id. at 8 (noting that the "FTA could include a provision calling for the periodic review of the
implementation and operation of the IPR Chapter, and giving the Parties an opportunity to undertake
further negotiations").
161. See, e.g., Letter from Henry A. Waxman et al. to Susan Schwab (Mar. 12, 2007), available at
http://www.oversight.house.gov/Documents/20070312150354-57129.pdf (noting that side letters in
recent FTAs signed by the US inadequately protect public health needs).
162. Peru & Panama FTA Changes, supra note 156, at 8.
163. See, e.g., Letter from Henry A. Waxman et al., supra note 80 (stating that the recent listing of
Thailand in the Special 301 Report in response to Thailand's TRIPS-complaint compulsory licenses
"calls into question the United States' commitment to the Doha declaration"); Letter from Henry A.
Waxman et al., supra note 161 (noting that recent FTAs signed by the U.S. "appear to undermine" the
Doha Declaration, as well as the Trade Promotion Authority Act directing the Administrative branch to
adhere to the Doha Declaration).
164. See Back to the Drawing Board, ANDEAN GROUP REP., Nov. 29, 2005, at 5 (noting that Co-
lombia and Ecuador announced that they were ending negotiations for an Andean free trade agreement);
US Congress Agrees to Extend Series of Trade Preferences, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Dec.
13, 2006 (noting that the U.S. had failed to conclude FTAs with Ecuador or Bolivia).
165. In addition, although trade representatives of the United States have successfully concluded
negotiations, actual approval by Congress of these agreements remains unclear or, at least, subject to
renegotiation to include tougher labor standards. See Eoin Callan, Industry Drive to Save Trade Deals,
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Americas ("FTAA")-originally scheduled to be completed by January
2005-has stalled, with no draft texts since 2003 and no start date set for
relaunching negotiations.166
Negotiations have also stalled on a FTA between the United States
and Thailand. Although the reasons are complicated by the recent compul-
sory licenses, as well as the lack of a democratic government, Thailand
raised interesting issues of broader applicability. For example, Thailand
found the proposed FTA inconsistent with human rights and national sov-
ereignty not only because of the negative impact on medicines, but because
acceptance of unilateral terms was considered to cede sovereignty to the
United States.16 7 These issues apply to other FTAs that are negotiated using
the same template by USTR.
III. MOVING BEYOND TRIPS-PLUS
Although countries are continuing to negotiate TRIPS-plus agree-
ments, there is a global movement running counter to the trend of ever-
increasing intellectual property right norms. In particular, a wide variety of
actors-including developing countries, non-governmental organizations,
and individuals-are taking actions to emphasize the importance of public
health in relation to patent rights.
A. International Activity
At the international organization level, the biggest issue under current
discussion is a proposal for the World Intellectual Property Organization
("WIPO") to adopt a development agenda. WIPO agreements are not for-
mally part of the WTO framework. Yet, to the extent that they become part
of international law, they can still influence interpretation of WTO agree-
ments such as TRIPS. Argentina and Brazil first proposed a development
agenda for WIPO in August 2004.168 The initial proposal laid out a variety
FIN. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2006; Mark Drajem, Panama, U.S. Sign Trade Deal/Pact Awaits Tough Opposi-
tion from Democrats, HOUS. CHRON., Dec. 20, 2006, at Business 7.
166. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, FTAA Ministerials, http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-
Agreements/Regional/FTAA/FTAAMinisterials/SectionIndex.html (last visited Feb. 15, 2007).
167. See, e.g., Thai Human Rights Commission Criticises FTA with US, BILATERALS.ORG, Jan. 26,
2007, http://www.bilaterals.org/article.php3?idarticle=7012 (last visited July 6, 2007).
168. World Intellectual Prop. Org. Secretariat, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establish-
ment of a Development Agenda for WIPO, WIPO Doc. WO/GA/31/I1 (Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter
WIPO Proposal]. In addition, even before formal WIPO activity, debate and momentum to internation-
ally address development issues began after the UK Commission on Intellectual Property Rights pub-
lished a report critical of the application of intellectual property rights to development. SISULE F.
MUSUNGU, RETHINKING INNOVATION, DEVELOPMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE UN:
WIPO AND BEYOND 12 (2005).
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of ideas for WIPO members to consider. On the broad framework of intel-
lectual property-the mission of WIPO-the proposal suggested that intel-
lectual property should be a "policy instrument" and that greater attention
should be paid to ensure that costs do not outweigh benefits. More specifi-
cally, the proposal suggested that intellectual property norm setting should
actively embrace a perspective of developing countries consistent with a
variety of other international activity, including the UN Millennium Devel-
opment Goals and the WTO Doha Development Agenda. 169 The proposal
suggested that if negotiations on the draft Substantive Patent Law Treaty
("SPLT") were informed by a development perspective, future discussions
would consider the entirety of the treaty (as previously proposed by devel-
oping countries), proposals to include public interest flexibilities, and lan-
guage mirroring Articles 7 and 8 of TRIPS. In addition, beyond the
political "hot potato" of the SPLT, the Argentina-Brazil proposal laid out
additional suggestions, ranging from more committees within WIPO and
greater participation of civil society, to a "high level" declaration on the
development aspect and a new treaty on access to knowledge and technol-
ogy.
The initial proposal for a development agenda has spawned a variety
of activity under the auspices of WIPO, as well as other fora. Although
initial meetings did not seem promising-since discussions included de-
bates about the propriety and scope of a specific development commit-
tee 170-most recent meetings have been hailed as achieving remarkable
progress. This section will provide highlights of activity fostered by the
initial WIPO proposal. First, shortly after the proposal for a development
agenda, a Declaration on the Future of WIPO was pronounced at Geneva.
The Declaration was supported by developing countries and hundreds of
civil society organizations (such as Medicines Sans Frontires), scientists,
academics, and others. 171
A proposed Treaty on Access to Knowledge ("A2K") was crafted in
2005 and has been the subject of continued discussion. 172 The essence of
169. WIPO Proposal, supra note 168, annex at 1-2 (noting that the WIPO norm-setting activities
"largely exceed existing obligations under ... TRIPS ... while ... countries are still struggling with
the costly process of implementing TRIPS itself').
170. See William New & Tove Iren S. Gerhardson, WIPO Development Agenda Talks End with No
Agreement for Now, IP-WATCH, June 30, 2006, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/ in-
dex.php?p=346 (noting conclusion of recent round of negotiations without agreement).
171. Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO 3-14 (Oct 4, 2004), available at
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.doc.
172. For example, Yale Law School has hosted two major conference on A2K that brought together
academics as well as activists. See Yale Access to Knowledge Conference, http://research.yale.edu/
isp/eventsa2k.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). Additional information about the substance of the
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A2K is to ensure a balance between intellectual property owners and users
not only in patents, but in all intellectual property disciplines. The current
draft framework mirrors the minimum standards of TRIPS, but in the re-
verse direction; whereas TRIPS requires all members to adopt certain
minimum levels of protection, A2K suggests all members adopt certain
minimum standards of access.173 On the patent dimension, A2K echoes the
Doha Public Health Declaration by reinforcing that TRIPS does not and
should not prevent member states from adopting measures to protect public
health. 174
In addition, A2K challenges some present interpretations concerning
the scope of patentable subject matter as well as patent rights under TRIPS.
In particular, A2K suggests excluding higher life forms from patentabil-
ity. 175 This is in direct contravention to TRIPS Article 27(3)(b) as well as
the law of many industrialized countries that require higher life forms to be
patented. With respect to patent rights, A2K suggests a safe harbor from
infringement for improvement inventions, as well as "compassionate use"
of medicine and medical technology. 176 Although the phrase "compassion-
ate use" may lead to a quagmire of interpretive problems, the suggestion
that patents be used for promoting public health is important. While seem-
ingly reasonable from a health perspective, compassionate use is much
broader than the present laws of some nations. For example, in the United
States there is no statutory safe harbor, and common law exclusions for
experimental use have been narrowly interpreted.177 Compassionate use as
an exception to infringement seems inimical to present United States patent
laws that not only permit the patenting of medical procedures and tech-
nologies, but also enable patent owners to recover from those who contrib-
ute to patent infringement.
conference and subsequent discussions is available on a wiki at http://research.yale.edu/isp/
a2k/wiki/index.php/YaleA2KConference (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
173. Draft Treaty on Access to Knowledge, art 1-2, May 9, 2005, available at
http://www.cptech.org/a2k/consolidatedtext-may9.pdf.
174. Id. art. 1-3(c).
175. Id. art. 4-1(a)(viii).
176. Id. arts. 4-1(b)(ii), (iv).
177. E.g. Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1360-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002). But see Merck KGaA v.
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005) (providing a slightly expanded interpretation of a
limited statutory provision exempting certain activity from the scope of infringement). The lack of
exceptions to patent infringement has been repeatedly noted as a problem, but despite repeated discus-
sion of the issue, there has been no change thus far to the patent laws. See generally, e.g., Rebecca S.
Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1017 (1989) (discussing the problems surrounding the experimental use exception); Maureen A.
O'Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 1177 (2000) (proposing
a fair use defense comparable to that found in copyright law).
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The concrete A2k proposals have fostered discussion that challenges
TRIPS-plus provisions. For example, draft text for a "Paris Accord," dis-
cussed at a meeting of the Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue ("TACD") in
June 2006, builds upon some of the principles of A2K. 178 The goal of the
Accord is to establish an "agreement between creative communities and the
public." While the language is stated to be "far from final," its principles
are nonetheless interesting in reflecting additional movement away from
TRIPS-plus requirements.
For example, it echoes A2K in declaring that "science depends upon
access to knowledge" and that intellectual property rules "should not pre-
vent experimental use." 179 Although the terms "data protection" or "data
exclusivity" are not specifically invoked, they are nonetheless addressed.
The proposal suggests that "methods of protecting investments in clinical
trials for new medicines should not prevent governments from making
medicines available at affordable prices or require unethical or unnecessary
replication of human experiments."' 180 In other words, rules providing data
exclusivity that are premised on the necessity to protect financial invest-
ment in clinical trials should not function in a way that would interfere with
public access to medicine. The more difficult question is how to achieve
this goal-especially in light of TRIPS-plus agreements that may already
interfere with public health. In addition to supporting A2K goals, the draft
text also supports a global agreement to better support financing of drug
research' 81 and specifically rejects the traditional business model of multi-
national pharmaceutical companies that uses high drug prices to finance
research. 182
Most recently, some A2K goals entered mainstream political discus-
sions within WIPO. In particular, WIPO members agreed to "initiate dis-
cussions on how, within WIPO's mandate, to further facilitate access to
knowledge and technology for developing countires and LDCs."'1 83 In addi-
178. Draft Paris Accord, June 17, 2006, available at http://www.cptech.org/a2k/pa/ParisAccord-
june I 7draft.pdf. The TACD is comprised of over sixty U.S. and EU consumer organizations that aim to
propose joint recommendations to their respective governments. See TACD, About TACD,
http://www.tacd.org/about/about.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
179. Draft Paris Accord, supra note 178, at 2.
180. Id.
181. Id. (noting that "[g]ovemments must support global agreements to share in the costs of evalu-
ating new medicines").
182. Id. (suggesting that "when possible and appropriate" the current system of stimulating re-
search and development through high prices "should be replaced with new systems that reward devel-
opers ... for improved health care outcomes").
183. See, e.g., Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, Negotiators Agree to Add Access to Knowledge to WIPO
Mandate, IP-WATCH, June 14, 2007, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=654&
res= 280&print=0 (internal quotations omitted).
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tion, the member states agreed that WIPO should "promote norm-setting
activities related to IP that support a robust public domain.' 84 While the
WIPO discussions lack the detail of prior proposals of A2K, the inclusion
of A2k principles is nonetheless noteworthy and seen as a major step for-
ward. 185 Although the WIPO general assembly must still approve the re-
port, the consensus is considered a major achievement; one report
suggested that the discussion "potentially rewrote the UN Body's man-
date."186
Beyond the aspirational goals embodied in A2K-type proposals, there
are additional proposals to radically modify current systems in order to
achieve a better balance between patents and public health. These proposals
involve both systems for promoting health research and systems to address
intellectual property barriers. For example, some have suggested global
research and development treaties that would ask countries to adopt a vari-
ety of different mechanisms to support all diseases, rather than those
deemed most profitable by pharmaceutical companies. 187 Some proposals
suggest that countries should provide differing amounts of support for re-
search based upon their national income levels. Others suggest giving trade
credits to countries that foster projects promoting social or public interest
objectives. One of the boldest suggestions for addressing the TRIPS-plus
movement lies in the Medical Research and Development Treaty Proposal
of 2005, which suggests that countries not only develop alternative means
for supporting research, but also forego dispute resolution and trade sanc-
tions under various trade agreements. Rather, countries would utilize the
treaty framework to support innovation. 188
An interesting recent development is the resolution by the World
Health Organization to take a greater role in promoting development of
research and access to drugs. At the annual WHO summit, member states
adopted a resolution that not only encouraged the organization to provide
support to countries that "intend to make use of the flexibilities" in TRIPS,
but also to "encourage the development of proposals for health-needs
driven research and development" that would include a range of incentive
184. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
185. See WIPO Members Agree on Development Agenda, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG.,
June 20, 2007, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-06-20/story I.htm.
186. William New, In a "Major Achievement, " WIPO Negotiators Create New Development
Mandate, IP-WATCH, June 18, 2007, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=656
&res= 1280&print=0.
187. See, e.g., Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D,
2 PLoS BIOLOGY 147 (2004).




mechanisms. 189 The resolution is particularly noteworthy since just one
month previously, members were divided with respect to WHO's appropri-
ate role both with respect to TRIPS, as well as with respect to proposals to
foster research and development. 190 On the other hand, past experience
suggests that the WHO may have difficulty in developing proposals that
satisfy all parties. For example, reactions were mixed in response to a re-
cent report authored by a commission of the WHO on promoting innova-
tion that would address the needs of developing countries. 191 Public health
sympathizers argued that the report failed to go far enough in its recom-
mendations, whereas the pharmaceutical industry largely opposed the sub-
stance of the report for reaching too far.192
While it is too early to determine whether the WHO will achieve its
goal in promoting long-term development of drugs and access to drugs, it
has already taken an important step towards fostering access. In particular,
at the same annual WHO summit, member states reached a preliminary
agreement that promotes use of TRIPS flexibilities. A present draft urges
member states to "provide, whenever necessary, in their legislation for use,
to the full, of the flexibilities contained in ... [TRIPS] in order to promote
access to pharmaceutical products." 193 This language is stronger than lan-
guage that was supported by the United States, Switzerland, and Japan, that
suggested that countries should consider whether to adapt legislation to
enable TRIPS flexibilities. 194
189. Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, WHA60.30 (May 24, 2007), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA60/A60_R30-en.pdf. Despite the resolution, the U.S. has
disassociated itself from the decision. See WHO Members Adopt Resolution on Pharmaceutical Innova-
tion, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., May 23, 2007, available at http://www.ictsd.org/
weekly/07-05-23/story2,htm.
190. See, e.g., WHO Members Divided over Plan for Promoting Pharmaceutical Innovation,
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., Apr. 25, 2007, available at http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/07-04-
25/story3.htm (noting controversy over whether WHO should deal with TRIPS and bilateral trade
agreements, as well as controversial funding mechanisms for pharmaceutical innovation).
191. WORLD HEALTH ORG., PUBLIC HEALTH, INNOVATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, INNOVATION AND PUBLIC
HEALTH 171-88 (2006).
192. See, e.g., Elen 't Hoen, Report of the Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation
and Public Health: A Call to Governments, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 421, 422 (2006) (criticiz-
ing the report for failing to provide better proposals); Reactions Strong but Mixed to WHO Report on IP
and Medicines Access, IP-WATCH, Apr. 4, 2006, available at http://www.ip-
watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=261&print-l (noting criticisms from both health groups and pharma-
ceutical interests).
193. Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, WHO Members Reach Preliminary Agreement on TRIPS and Ma-
laria, IP-WATCH, May 21, 2007, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=
624&res=1 280&print-0 (brackets in original) (internal quotations omitted).
194. Id.; see also World Health Org., Malaria, Including a Proposal for Establishment of World
Malaria Day, at 2, EBI20.RI6 (Feb. 1, 2007), available at http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/
pdf files/EB 120/B I20_R I6-en.pdf (stating that member states are urged to "consider, whenever neces-
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B. Domestic Efforts
Another alternative to TRIPS-plus provisions lies in the newly
amended patent laws of India. Thus far, India has resisted the temptation of
compromising public health through enhanced patent rights in exchange for
greater market access in other sectors. Although India recently had to
amend its patent laws to comply with the TRIPS requirement to provide
patents to pharmaceutical products, its amendments took some novel ap-
proaches that could serve as a useful illustration to other countries with
respect to how to balance patent rights and public health needs. For exam-
ple, India carved new exceptions to its scope of patentable subject matter in
an attempt to avoid overprotection of pharmaceutical drugs that are of little
improved therapeutic value. Unlike some FTAs, India's Patent Act specifi-
cally states that the discovery of new uses or properties of known sub-
stances are not patentable if they do not enhance efficacy. 195 Another novel
characteristic of India's patent laws is that patent protection granted based
upon patent grants in other jurisdictions (filed under the "mailbox" provi-
sion of TRIPS) are only enforceable prospectively from the date of patent
issuance. Generic companies that were making and selling the now-
patented drug prior to the grant are permitted to continue producing such
generic drugs under a de facto compulsory license, which provides a rea-
sonable royalty to the patent owner.19 6 Thus, India still permits some ge-
neric production of currently patented drugs.
Another important option that individual countries may take is to chal-
lenge patents and even patent applications more aggressively, especially in
combination with more rigorous standards of patentability. India provides
one model of enabling third parties to oppose not only issued patents, but
also patent applications before they are granted. 197 In fact, India recently
sary, adapting national legislation in order to use to the full the flexibilities contained in the Agreement
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights").
195. Compare The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005, 3(d), with
Oman FTA, supra note 126, art. 15.8(I)(b) (confirming that patents are available for known products
for the treatment of medical conditions).
196. However, this is only available for generic manufacturers that have made a substantial invest-
ment and sold the drug from January 1, 2005, to the present. The Patents (Amendment) Act 10(c)
(India).
197. The first successful pre-grant opposition was used in March 2006 by the Indian Network for
People Living with HIV/AIDS (INP+) against a drug by GlaxoSmithKline. The challenge was based on
Section 3(d) of the 2005 Indian patent law and claimed that the drug was merely a combination of two
existing drugs. Following the opposition, GlaxoSmithKline withdrew its patent applications for the
drug. See, e.g., M~decins Sans Fronti~res, Briefing Note, A Key Source of Affordable Medicines Is at
Risk of Drying Up 4 (Dec. 2006). In addition, there are a number of other pre-grant oppositions cur-
rently filed, including some by generic companies. See, e.g., Noemie Bisserbe, Local Pharma Strikes
First in Patent War, ECON. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006 (noting that generic companies have filed over one
hundred pre-grant oppositions and that after four or five cases, the patent office has ruled in favor of the
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reinstated the pre-grant opposition period to encourage early challenges to
inventions that should not be patented. 198 This additional opportunity was
successfully utilized by the Cancer Patient Aid Opposition, which con-
vinced the Indian patent office to deny a patent for Novartis's anti-cancer
drug Gleevac. 199 In particular, the patent office found the application un-
patentable in light of the 2005 Indian Patent Act, which excludes pharma-
ceutical derivatives from patentability unless they differ significantly from
the original compound with regard to efficacy. 200 This standard of pat-
entability is striking in comparison to most other patent laws that have no
requirement that a compound show increased efficacy. Indeed, the com-
pound that was rejected in India has been granted a patent in over forty
countries. The provision is no accident; rather, it reflects India's attempt to
comply with TRIPS's requirement of patents on pharmaceutical products
while simultaneously recognizing a historical sensitivity to the impact of
patents on health care. Prior to TRIPS, India permitted patents on processes
of making pharmaceuticals, but not on the products themselves in an at-
tempt to spur generic production and enhance the availability of drugs. In
addition, the provision at issue here, Section 3(d), was designed to prevent
"evergreening," a common practice used by drug companies to obtain addi-
tional patents for small improvements to previously patented compounds.
Although evergreening is recognized as an issue worldwide due to its nega-
tive impact in delaying introduction of lower-cost generic drugs, no country
before India had attempted to directly bar the practice through heightened
patentability requirements.
Whether India's patent requirement of increased efficacy for pharma-
ceutical derivatives will be a model for balancing patents and public health,
opposition each time); Amelia Gentleman & Hai Kumar, AIDS Groups in India Sue to Halt Patent for
U.S. Drug, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 2006, at A4 (noting that two patients-rights groups challenged Gilead
Science's patent application on the antiretroviral drug Viread as not sufficiently new under India's law).
198. The time for opposition has been extended to a minimum period of six months from publica-
tion (instead of the older three month period) with expanded grounds, as well as an opportunity for a
hearing. Press Release, India Ministry of Commerce & Indus., Important Changes Incorporated in the
Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2005 as Compared to the Patents (Amendment) Bill, 2003, at 7-10 (Mar.
23, 2005), available at http:/pib.nic.in/release/release.asp?relid=8906.
199. The Gleevac application was not a standard application. Rather, under TRIPS rules, Novartis
had initially requested an exclusive marketing right for Gleevac in 1998, based upon TRIPS rules that
permit a company to request patent-like rights in a country where product patents are not yet available
for pharmaceuticals. Novartis succeeded in obtaining such exclusive marketing rights in 2003. Novartis
then promptly sued generic makers of its compound based on the exclusive marketing rights, with
conflicting results in the courts. Meanwhile, third-party oppositions challenged the patent.
200. The Patents (Amendment) Act 3 (India) (providing that "the mere discovery of a new form
of a known substance which does not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance
or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a
known process, machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at
least one new reactant" is not patentable),
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or an example of the difficulties of attempting to do so, remains to be seen.
Novartis has challenged the Indian Patent Act as unconstitutional and in
violation of TRIPS. 20 1 According to Novartis, India should not be entitled
to establish requirements for patentability beyond the traditional standards
of novelty, non-obviousness, and utility. Despite pleas and negative public-
ity from public health organizations, Novartis is persisting in its chal-
lenge.202 If successful, generic versions of drugs in India will be delayed,
as they currently are in other countries.
C. Technology Solutions
1. Working with the Existing Patent System
Even in nations that do not currently embrace an opposition system for
third parties (either before or after a patent issues), current technology pro-
vides means to aid patent examiners in minimizing the number of over-
broad patents where there is prior art. For example, in the United States,
which has discussed, but not yet enacted, any form of opposition system,
the pilot "Peer to Patent" project, sponsored by corporate giants such as
IBM and Microsoft, aims to use peer review and a Wiki-based network to
help official patent examiners locate and consider relevant prior art.203
While the project was conceived to improve prior art searches, this model
could be used in conjunction with the current opposition system in India to
assist patent offices in locating the best prior art, thereby limiting the issu-
ance of invalid patents. This opportunity may be particularly important
because once patents are issued in the United States, they carry a presump-
tion of validity in litigation, with few opportunities for administrative op-
position.204
201. See, e.g., Novartis Files 2 Patent Suits in Chennai Court, TIMES OF INDIA, Aug. 18, 2006.
202. See, e.g., Press Release, M~decins Sans Frontibres, MSF Urges Novartis to Drop its Case
Against the Indian Government (Dec. 20, 2006), available at http://www.accessmed-msf.org/
prod/publications.asp?scntid=20122006113976&contenttype=PARA&.
203. Press Release, Peer to Patent Project, Community Patent Review Project Will Open Patent
Examination Process to Online Peer Review, Using Web-Based Technologies to Connect Scientific
Experts and the Patent Office (Aug. 29 2006), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/ communitypat-
ent/pressrelease_082906.html. For the theoretical background behind this new project, see Beth Simone
Novek, "Peer to Patent": Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform, 20 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 123 (2006).
204. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (presumption of validity). Moreover, in light of the fact that there is no
serious means to challenge patents outside the litigation context, borderline patents may be unfairly
used by patent trolls to extort money from health care providers.
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2. Solutions Outside the Patent System
Some scientists are turning to open-source research as an alternative to
the traditional patent system. Open research in lieu of patent protection has
been, and continues to be, globally considered. 2 05 Most prominently, the
World Health Organization has been addressing medium-term approaches
to sustaining a global approach of researching and developing drugs that
predominantly impact the developing world. These multi-faceted ap-
proaches explicitly consider open-source, open-access, and other types of
collaborations.20 6 .Some Western countries, including members of the
European Union, have expressly supported the idea of patent pooling at
WHO meetings. 20 7 Although the support at this point is only for the general
principle, rather than a specific proposal, movement along this line is a
marked contrast to the bilateral agreements entered into by the EU and
other countries that specifically mandate TRIPS-plus levels of patent pro-
tection.
Some open-source projects already exist, ranging from projects that
operate on an international scale, spanning multiple countries, to more do-
mestic projects. 208 In many cases, participants agree to release data into the
public domain to promote access and avoid the problem of patent thickets.
One ambitious project aims to not only use open-source access, but also to
promote web-based research and development in areas of particular interest
to developing countries. For example, the Tropical Disease Initiative,
established in 2004, relies on the volunteer efforts of scientists using elec-
tronic bulletin boards and blogs as building blocks. 209 Any promising
research results are then sent to "virtual pharmas," charity-based groups
that will contract with corporate partners to produce and market drugs. The
goal is to drastically decrease the costs of drug development by using both
205. For example, the draft Paris Accord previously referred to similarly supports open research
projects that would enable follow-on innovation. Draft Paris Accord, supra note 178, at 2.
206. World Health Organization Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation
& Intellectual Property, Elements of a Global Strategy and Plan of Action, WHO Doe.
A/PHI/1GWG/l/5 (Nov. 2, 2006).
207. See, e.g., Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, WHO Members Take Small Steps with New Medicine R&D
Plan in Novel Exercise, IP-WATCH, Dec. 7, 2006, available at http://www.ip-watch.org/ we-
blog/index.php?p=482 (noting that France supported the idea of patent pooling and that the EU was
open to exploring patent pooling as well).
208. For information about the HapMap project, see, for example, International HapMap Consor-
tium, The International HapMap Project, 426 NATURE 789 (2003); International HapMap Project
Home Page, http://www.hapmap.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2007). Alternatively, for information on
CAMBIA's project, see CAMBIA Biological Open Source (BiOS) Initiative Home Page,
http://www.bios.net/daisy/bios/home.html (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
209. Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai & Andrej Sali, Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open
Source the Answer?, I PLOS MED. 180 (2004); see also Tropical Disease Initiative Home Page,
http://www.tropicaldisease.org (last visited Feb. 16, 2007).
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volunteer workers and a not-for-profit organization. 210 At a minimum, this
project is designed on a very different framework than the "blockbuster"
model of pharmaceutical development and profit maximization that most
large drug companies currently utilize. This project pays great attention to
promoting drugs that will likely be highly lucrative, without regard to
whether they promote maximal global needs.
CONCLUSION
Patents and public health in a post-TRIPS world is an exciting but un-
certain issue. Although news stories frequently trumpet new developments,
it seems nearly impossible to maintain the current perspective with so much
push and pull between the interests of developed and developing countries.
Although the trend towards TRIPS-plus agreements is disconcerting to the
interest and ability of countries to maintain public health interests, the
strong counter-movements are highly encouraging. The global attention to
the important intersection of patents and public health has the potential to
lead to important discussions, as well as an eventual balance that all nations
can tolerate.
210. Maurer, Rai & Sali, supra note 209, at 180.
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